



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**A NON-CONVENTIONAL INTERDICTION STRATEGY  
FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

by

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June 2007

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WAR ON TERROR**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The purpose of this thesis is to explore an alternative strategic focus for the Department of Defense to implement in the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism. Our thesis is as follows: A non-conventional approach to strategic policy, led by an enhanced Foreign Internal Defense concept, and judicious execution of US Sponsored Unconventional Warfare, applied as a primary tool of U.S. national policy through the Department of Defense, will serve as an effective solution to the global “terrorist” threat.

This paper will justify such by analyzing the historical conduct of the United States through the framework of its own doctrine and the “Mystic Diamond” a State/Counter-state dynamic model as presented by Dr. Gordon McCormick. Elements of the Department of Defense and the Department of State know the operational strategy to take, but are hampered by the misapplication of counter-guerilla tactics as strategy, and are reluctant to use sponsored UW to preempt or curtail the exportation of terrorism. In essence, the Department of Defense has been and continues to be limited by its conventional tactical successes, when what is required is strategic application of FID, UW, and limited Direct Engagement to defeat an enemy employing a non-conventional method of engagement.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Today we are engaged in a global counterinsurgency, an unprecedented challenge which requires a level of original strategic thought and depth of understanding perhaps comparable only to that of the Cold War.

--David W. Barno<sup>1</sup>

### A. PURPOSE/THESIS STATEMENT

The purpose of this thesis is to explore an alternative strategic focus for the Department of Defense (DoD) to implement in the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Our thesis is as follows: *A non-conventional approach to strategic policy, led by an enhanced Foreign Internal Defense concept, and judicious execution of US Sponsored Unconventional Warfare, applied as a primary tool of U.S. national policy through the Department of Defense, will serve as an effective solution to the global “terrorist” threat. This paper will justify such by analyzing the historical conduct of the United States through the framework of its own doctrine and the “Mystic Diamond” a State/Counter-state dynamic model as presented by Dr. Gordon McCormick. Elements of the Department of Defense and the Department of State know the operational strategy to take, but are hampered by the misapplication of counter-guerilla tactics as strategy, and are reluctant to use sponsored UW to preempt or curtail the exportation of terrorism. In essence, the Department of Defense has been and continues to be limited by its conventional tactical successes, when what is required is strategic application of FID, UW, and limited Direct Engagement to defeat an enemy employing a non-conventional method of engagement.*<sup>2</sup>

### B. METHODOLOGY

This thesis is written with the assumption that the reader has knowledge of Dr. Gordon McCormick’s State/Counter-state model, the “Mystic Diamond.” An explanation of the “Mystic Diamond” can be found at the end of this chapter and it is recommended that the reader understand the “Mystic Diamond” prior to reading the thesis. We will apply the following methodology: The remainder of Chapter I will

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<sup>1</sup> David W. Barno, “Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency,” *Parameters*, (Summer 2006): 15.

<sup>2</sup> We understand the Irregular Warfare concept and have specifically steered away from it. We feel the IW concept is just a catchall for everything not conventional.

examine the background surrounding GWOT and present Dr. McCormick's State/Counter-state model. Chapter II will discuss the GWOT problem, analyze the current U.S. and DoD strategy, discuss the shortcomings of that strategy, and determine the nature of the global insurgent threat. Chapter III will draw parallels between the success and failures of the Cold War. Chapter IV will propose an alternative strategy for DoD to follow. Within chapter IV we will lay out a combination of the use of FID, UW, and Conventional attacks and examine cases where each has been successful or failed. Chapter V will analyze the proposed strategy to see if it is a balance strategy. Chapter VI will provide a conclusion and some recommendations.

We recognize that any strategy to combat the GWOT must apply all elements of national power (Diplomatic, Information Operations, Military, Economic, Law Enforcement, and Finance). Since DoD does not have tasking authority this strategy does not address the other elements of national power. This strategy does not address the specific problem of Iraq and Afghanistan.

### **C. BACKGROUND**

Terrorism is not a new problem. It has been around for centuries and during the 1980's and 1990's Americans increasingly became targets of terrorism. On September 11, 2001 al Qaeda<sup>3</sup> escalated the magnitude of terrorism when it conducted an attack against the United States. The attack killed 3056 personnel from 90 different countries on American soil.<sup>4</sup> The scale of terrorism dramatically increased from occasional bombings abroad and plane hijackings to coordinated attacks on U.S. soil.

Looking at al Qaeda's attacks through the lens of the Dr. Gordon McCormick's Mystic Diamond, its purpose was to attack the U.S. directly and erode the support of the population. The attack may have been against U.S. citizens, but "their political-strategic targets are the decisionmakers [sic] and influencing elites in the United States and in the global community."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Al Qaeda is spelled in numerous ways. The authors will use this spelling unless directly quoting from a source that has it spelled another way.

<sup>4</sup> "September 11, 2001: Basic Facts," *U.S. Department of State*, 12 August 2002 [Website]; available from <http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12701.htm>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2007.

<sup>5</sup> Barno, 19.



Shortly after September 11, 2001 the United States conducted unconventional warfare operations against the Taliban of Afghanistan in order to conduct a regime change and kill or capture al Qaeda members. In January 2002 the United States, in conjunction with Philippine forces, began conducting Foreign Internal Defense operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group. In March 2003 the U.S. conducted a conventional attack against Iraq in order to conduct regime change.

Currently the U.S. is still engaged in conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in all three of these countries with varying results. In Afghanistan, COIN operations have become increasingly conventional.<sup>6</sup> The U.S. military is surging additional forces into Iraq to help stem a deteriorating situation. In the Philippines and South East Asia the U.S. is using an indirect approach [less kinetic] to conduct COIN operations with better results.<sup>7</sup>

**D. GORDON MCCORMICK’S STATE/COUNTER-STATE MODEL, THE “MYSTIC DIAMOND”<sup>8</sup>**

The “Mystic Diamond” is a state/counter-state model that was developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School. His model presents a feasible strategy that could be adopted by forces [the state] fighting an insurgency. The “Mystic Diamond” incorporates all elements of national power and can be applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. It emphasizes an indirect approach to fighting an insurgency.

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<sup>6</sup> John R. Dyke and John R. Crisafulli, “Unconventional Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 7-9.

<sup>7</sup> David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, “Winning in the Pacific: The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 44, 2007, 26.

<sup>8</sup> Gordon McCormick, *Intro to Guerrilla Warfare*, Class notes. Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006.




Figure 1. Dr. Gordon McCormick's "Mystic Diamond" Model. (From: *Intro to Guerrilla Warfare*)<sup>9</sup>

The "Mystic Diamond" consists of four parties, the state, the counter-state, the population, and the international community. Each party will be defined as follows:

**State**-The state is the current government or occupying force that controls the country or nation. The state is in direct conflict with the counter-state for control of the country or nation and the support of the population. The state controls the counterinsurgency forces.

- **Counter State**-The group or element that is conducting insurgent operations against the state. The counter-state is in direct conflict with the state for the

<sup>9</sup> McCormick.

control of country or nation and the support of the population. The counter-state controls the insurgent forces. The counter-state may or may not have international support.

- Population-The residents of the disputed country or nation that neither actively support the counter-state nor are part of the state apparatus.
- International Community-Other countries or nations as well as non-governmental organizations that are external to the state and counter-state. Elements of the international community may or may not support the state or counter-state.

The state and counter-state are competing for the control of the country or state, the population's support and the support of international sponsors. Initially each has an advantage. The state has a force and resource advantage. The counter-state starts out with an information advantage. The state has the capability to fight the insurgents, but lacks the information of where to locate the insurgents. The counter-state has the information of where to locate the state's forces and infrastructure, but lacks the forces and resources to do so. Both the state and counter-state have the following [operational] strategies to use in the conduct of insurgent and counter-insurgent operations:

Available [Operational] Strategies:

1. Extend infrastructure domestically. Both the state and counter-state attempt to gain the support of the population. The state does this by providing the necessary services and the security that the population needs to feel safe. The counter-state does this by undermining the state's efforts and stepping in to fill the void.
2. Operate indirectly and attack the state's or counter-state's infrastructure. Each side attempts to show that the other side is illegitimate in the eyes of the population thereby decreasing the support of the population.
3. Attack the state or counter-state directly. Each side attacks the other directly. Typical conventional force-on- force operations with the intent to kill, capture, or disrupt the enemy.
4. Operate indirectly and attack state's or counter-state's International infrastructure. Each side attempts to disrupt the other's support from the international community by showing the other is illegitimate.

5. Extend infrastructure internationally. Each side attempts to gain the support of the international community. A show of support could be both active support in the form of aid to either the state or counter-state or a lack of support to the opposition.

As the state or counter-state conducts its [operational] strategy it will receive feedback. The feedback for the state may be additional intelligence and support from the population as well as a decrease in support to the counter-state. The strategies should be conducted in order, but if a target presents itself the state or counter-state should take the opportunity. If the state is capable it can conduct strategies 1, 2, 4, and 5 simultaneously.

In the next chapter we will analyze the current U.S. and DoD GWOT strategy showing that it emphasizes the direct approach, discuss the GWOT problem, and highlight its shortfalls. Additionally we examine the threat and show that an indirect approach is best suited for dealing with the current threat.

## **II. THE GWOT PROBLEM**

Fighting a world war is not new to America - neither is fighting an ideology. In the 20<sup>th</sup> Century the U.S. successfully fought two world wars, the second of which was followed by a “Cold War”. The world wars were against conventional enemies and the U.S. defeated those enemies conventionally. The “Cold War” had a conventional enemy, but also had an ideology that was being spread as a direct challenge to democracy. The U.S. could not engage the U.S.S.R. in a direct conventional manner for fear of escalating the conflict to nuclear war; instead the U.S. engaged the U.S.S.R. indirectly by supporting and countering insurgencies.

The enemy in the GWOT is not a conventional enemy, yet the Department of Defense is using a direct conventional method primarily focused in Iraq and Afghanistan. The battles DoD continues to fight are to hold onto the initial successes of those two campaigns. The main problem behind this is a strategy that relies primarily on a tactical direct approach, and focuses on conventional attrition of the enemy ranks. Looking at the GWOT through Dr. Gordon McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” the U.S. is primarily attempting to attack al Qaeda directly.

The primary problems with the current GWOT strategy are:

- The GWOT strategy primarily focuses on the enemy insurgent fighters and command and control elements, and not the recognized irregular center of gravity...the population.
- Primary focus on Afghanistan and Iraq, and not towards stemming potential insurgent hotbeds both in South East, and South Asia.

In addition some select constraints and limitations as well as the threat must be analyzed.

Through the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006 (NSCT) the President lays out the achievements the U.S. has made during the conduct of the GWOT. These successes are:

- We have deprived al-Qaida of safehaven [sic] in Afghanistan and helped a democratic government to rise in its place. Once a terrorist sanctuary ruled by the repressive Taliban regime, Afghanistan is now a full partner in the War on Terror.

- A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis is aggressively prosecuting the war against the terrorists in Iraq. Together, we are working to secure a united, stable, and democratic Iraq, now a new War on Terror ally in the heart of the Middle East.
- We have significantly degraded the al-Qaida network. Most of those in the al-Qaida network responsible for the September 11 attacks, including the plot's mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, have been captured or killed. We also have killed other key al-Qaida members, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the group's operational commander in Iraq who led a campaign of terror that took the lives of countless American forces and innocent Iraqis.
- We have led an unprecedented international campaign to combat terrorist financing that has made it harder, costlier, and riskier for al-Qaida and related terrorist groups to raise and move money.
- There is a broad and growing global consensus that the deliberate targeting of innocents is never justified by any calling or cause.
- Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity.
- We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and help prevent future attacks in the Homeland by enhancing our counterterrorism architecture through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Director of National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center. Overall, the United States and our partners have disrupted several serious plots since September 11, including al-Qaida plots to attack inside the United States.
- Numerous countries that were part of the problem before September 11 are now increasingly becoming part of the solution – and this transformation has occurred without destabilizing friendly regimes in key regions.<sup>10</sup>

Although progress has been made, significant challenges still face the United States. The NSCT lays out the following challenges:

- Terrorist networks today are more dispersed and less centralized. They are more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and less directed by a central command structure.
- While the United States Government and its partners have thwarted many attacks, we have not been able to prevent them all. Terrorists have struck in many places throughout the world, from Bali to Beslan to Baghdad.
- While we have substantially improved our air, land, sea, and border security, our Homeland is not immune from attack.

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<sup>10</sup> The White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington DC: Executive Office of the President, September 2006), 3-4.

- Terrorists have declared their intention to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to inflict even more catastrophic attacks against the United States, our allies, partners, and other interests around the world.
- Some states, such as Syria and Iran, continue to harbor terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad.
- The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry.
- Increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and media has enabled our terrorist enemies to communicate, recruit, train, rally support, proselytize, and spread their propaganda without risking personal contact.<sup>11</sup>

## **A. CURRENT STRATEGY SHORT FALLS**

### **1. National Strategy**

The United States Government revamped the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from the goals of February 2003:

- Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations.
- Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists.
- Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit.
- Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad.<sup>12</sup>

to a more realistic approach that establishes short and long-term goals. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006 list the following short-term objectives:

- Prevent attacks by terrorist networks.
- Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them.
- Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states.
- Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.<sup>13</sup>

The long-term objective is:

- Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, 4.

<sup>12</sup> The White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington DC: Executive Office of the President, February 2003), 15-24.

<sup>13</sup> The White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, 11-16.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 9.

The President's strategic vision clearly implies a direct method of engagement.

In the short run, the fight involves the application of all instruments of national power and influence to **kill or capture the terrorists** [author's emphasis added]; deny them safehaven [sic] and control of any nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD; render potential terrorist targets less attractive by strengthening security; and cut off their sources of funding and other resources they need to operate and survive.<sup>15</sup>

When analyzing the strategic vision through the "Mystic Diamond" we see that the vision emphasizes operational strategy (OS) 3, directly targeting the terrorists. The last element of the vision could be interpreted to use OS 1 and 5 to cut off the global population's support for terrorism. By analyzing the current strategy through the "Mystic Diamond" we see that the strategy uses a combination of direct and indirect methods of engagement, but still emphasizes the direct approach.

- Prevent attacks by terrorist networks.<sup>16</sup> Uses OS 3 of the "Mystic Diamond". The U.S. and allies attack the terrorist directly.
- Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them.<sup>17</sup> Uses OS 1 and 5 of the "Mystic Diamond". The U.S. is attempting to extend the WMD protection infrastructure both internally and internationally.
- Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states.<sup>18</sup> Uses OS 4. The U.S. is using sanctions to put pressure on state sponsors of terrorism and disrupt the flow of resources from those states.
- Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.<sup>19</sup> Uses all operational strategies of the "Mystic Diamond", but has an emphasis on OS 3. The U.S. is helping the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan while attacking the terrorists directly. Additionally the U.S. is attempting to gain international support for those fledging governments and show how the insurgencies within those countries are illegitimate.

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<sup>15</sup> The White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, 7.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 16.



The long-term objective is:

- Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism.<sup>20</sup> Uses OS 1 and 5. Attempting to influence the global population by spreading democracy and democratic governments.

## **2. Department of Defense Strategy**

The current Department of Defense Strategy is the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) dated 1 February 2006. The NMSP-WOT's lists the following military strategic objectives:

- Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive.
- Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.
- Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials and increase capacity for consequence management.
- Defeat terrorists and their organizations.
- Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations.
- Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.<sup>21</sup>

While seeming non-kinetic and indirect, in reality the operational focus continues to favor the use of a conventional strategy. By analyzing DoD's strategy through the "Mystic Diamond" we see that the strategy uses a combination of direct and indirect methods of engagement, but still emphasizes the direct approach.

- Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive.<sup>22</sup> Uses OS 3 and 5 of the "Mystic Diamond". The military will identify and attack critical parts of the terrorist network it can and will encourage and assist other countries to do the same.
- Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.<sup>23</sup> Uses OS 5 of the "Mystic Diamond". By enabling partner nations the military is attacking the terrorist infrastructure and popular support within those nations.
- Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials and increase capacity for consequence management.<sup>24</sup> Uses OS 1 and 5 of the

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<sup>20</sup> The White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, 9.

<sup>21</sup> United States Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1 February 2006), 6-7.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 7.

“Mystic Diamond”. The military is attempting to extend the WMD protection infrastructure both internally and internationally.

- Defeat terrorists and their organizations.<sup>25</sup> Uses OS 3 and 5 of the “Mystic Diamond” with emphasis on 3. The military attempts to find and kill terrorists it can and assist and encourage partner nations to do the same.
- Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations.<sup>26</sup> Primarily uses OS 3, but also OS 5 of the “Mystic Diamond”.
- Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.<sup>27</sup> Uses all strategies of the “Mystic Diamond”.

The DoD strategy is the better of the two strategies. It not only focuses on defeating terrorists, but also on supporting partner nations. The strategy should be reprioritized putting an emphasis on the indirect goals first and recognizing that the ability to influence the world population is what will win the war. Direct methods should be seen as supplemental support to erode the insurgent mechanism, or utilized as targets of opportunity arise.

The U.S. would do well to draft a new national strategy similar to the NMSP-WOT, but recognize and emphasize that the world population is the center of gravity for the terrorists. Without support of the population an insurgent can not survive.

In addition to the NMSP-WOT the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) was reviewed. The QDR is DoD’s analysis of how the DoD is conducting business...it is its’ report card. The 2006 QDR is important because it “is submitted in the fifth year of this long war.”<sup>28</sup> The QDR calls for the development of five “roadmaps”:

- Department institutional reform and governance.
- Irregular Warfare.
- Building partnership capacity.

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<sup>24</sup> United States Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, 2006, 7

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006), v.

- Strategic communication.
- Intelligence.<sup>29</sup>

All have importance in fighting the GWOT, but the last four have a direct impact on the GWOT. By looking at the “roadmaps” it appears that the QDR proposes using OS 1, 2, 4, and 5. The first “roadmap” will strengthen the domestic infrastructure by using OS 1. Irregular warfare will apply OS 2 and 4 to attack the enemies’ infrastructure. Building partnership capacity will use OS 4 and 5. Strategic communication will use all operational strategies. It helps to strengthen domestic and international support and can be used to directly attack the enemy’s ideology. Intelligence lays the foundation to enable all operational strategies to be used.

Further examination of the QDR shows that it calls for greater emphasis on, Irregular Warfare, and using an indirect approach to the GWOT; yet there is also emphasis on finding, attacking, and disrupting terrorist networks. The QDR says all of the right things, yet the following statement sends a confusing message:

The QDR is not a programmatic or budget document. Instead, it reflects the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense:

- Need to “find, fix and finish” combat operations against new and elusive foes.<sup>30</sup>

Through the lens of the “Mystic Diamond” the NMSP-WOT appears to be a balanced strategy and the QDR makes the proper recommendations, but looking at the results you see that DoD is not really following its strategy or the recommendations in the QDR. This is due to the fact the majority of the U.S. priority and effort are in Afghanistan and Iraq.

## **B. FOCUS ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ**

Currently, the struggle is centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we will need to be prepared and arranged to successfully defend our Nation and its interests around the globe for years to come.

--2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006), 2.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., vi.

The Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 lists 11,111 terrorist incidents that occurred world wide resulting in 14,602 noncombatant deaths of which 3,963 (35%) of those incidents were in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>32</sup> Although the data may be questionable the United States military is primarily concentrating its efforts on the 35%. The use of a direct method has resulted in an increase in the death toll of U.S. forces in Operations Enduring Freedom,<sup>33</sup> (OEF) Afghanistan, and Iraqi Freedom,<sup>34</sup> (OIF) Iraq, has steadily increased since 2001 and 2003 respectively.

The U.S. cannot continue to operate this way. The adversary necessitates the use of non-conventional methods and forces to either preempt or subvert nations or regional powers concentrating their efforts against the U.S. Short of deploying infantry divisions for every contingency, the United States can and must deter and defend against such world wide insurgent inception and propagation. We can easily see the need to focus on al Qaeda, but such principles of strategy can be applied broadly, within the context of the specific country or regional situation, to serve in the United States' security concerns.

The next section will examine some of the constraints and limitations that were used to help formulate an alternate strategy for the conduct of the GWOT.

### **C. FURTHER CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS**

There are several constraints and limitations that must be analyzed in the development of a new strategy. The following are selected constraints the U.S. faces:

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<sup>31</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, v.

<sup>32</sup> United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005*, (Washington DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2006), National Counterterrorism Center: Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, Statistical Annex, vi.

<sup>33</sup> In 2001 there were 11\* U.S. deaths. In 2006 there were 98 U.S. deaths. \*Conflicting numbers between two sources for more information see "Fallen Warriors," *Defend America, U.S. Department of Defense News about the War on Terror*, (n.d.) [Website]; available from <http://www.defendamerica.mil/fallen.html>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2007 and "Operation Enduring Freedom: Coalition Deaths by Year," *iCasualties.org*, (n.d.) [Website]; available from <http://www.icasualties.org/oef/DeathsByYear.aspx>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2007.

<sup>34</sup> In 2003 there were 481\* U.S. deaths. In 2006 there were 818. Conflicting numbers between two sources for more information see "Fallen Warriors," *Defend America, U.S. Department of Defense News about the War on Terror*, (n.d.) [Website]; available from <http://www.defendamerica.mil/fallen.html>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2007 and "Iraq Coalition Casualties Count," *iCasualties.org*, (n.d.) [Website]; available from <http://www.icasualties.org/oif/>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2007.

- Political Environment.
- Operational Environment.
- Manpower.
- Budgetary.
- Terminology.

## **1. Political Environment**

The political environment is very complex. In the conduct of GWOT the President must deal not only with the domestic political situation, but international political landscape as well. Today the President has to fight the GWOT, deal with the Iranian and North Korea issues, and after the November 2006 Congressional elections, contend with a Congress that is not overly supportive of the war in Iraq.

A direct method of engagement draws a lot of media attention and the global audience closely scrutinizes the United States' actions. A conventional approach requires moving mass amounts of troops and equipment, which in turn requires the support of allied countries. Whether it is basing rights or the ability to use ports and airfields to refuel and offload equipment, the U.S. needs the cooperation of allied countries. An indirect approach also requires the cooperation and support of allied countries, but the signature of U.S. forces is considerably smaller. The United States' current strategy is drawing much criticism and therefore its allies are under intense pressure. These major muscle movements of the United States military, in support of any President's peace time or war time engagement strategy, will draw scrutiny from and be limited by the attitude of not only the domestic, but also the global population. The problem faced is--how does DoD engage the perceived enemy or possible future foe without these emotional, but none-the-less invalid (with regards to political powers) restrictions?

Since the end of WWII, one can count the number of "high intensity" conflicts that the US has been involved with on one hand. And, half the time the outcomes of these primarily conventional conflicts have been dubious at best. The Korean War is technically still being fought; South Vietnam was engulfed by communism in 1973...only the first Gulf War and Operation Enduring Freedom have been successful in the stated goals. One could argue the point of U.S. military action in Grenada, Panama or Kosovo, but in reality and with an understanding of High Intensity Conflict, these

examples amount to either large scale raids, or limited strikes. What this shows, is that while the conventional military is good at its job of conventional confrontation, that confrontation for the United States has only occurred a small percentage of the time since WWII.

Low Intensity conflict, on the other hand has played a predominant role in the deployment of US troops in support of National Security objectives. During the entire Cold War, Special Operations Forces indirectly clashed with Soviet backed forces a majority of the time in multiple, global conflagrations. This engagement, while recorded in the history books, goes relatively un-remarked. Reason being those forces, their *raison d etre*, and their capabilities basically allowed them to conduct global communist deterrent actions while remaining under the radar as we will exemplify in later chapters (as we will exemplify in later chapters).

At the crux of the issue then, is this capability to defeat a global influence, as in the past, a superpower. It can be asserted that the demise of the Soviet Union was not due to the clash of two militaries on either the conventional or nuclear battlefield, but to the slow, indirect military and informational engagements carried on by our nation's FID and UW forces in places of seemingly little interest to the evening news. This, coupled with a diplomatic and economic foreign policy designed to strangle our adversary, carried the day. Without this public hyper-scrutiny, such operations in South Asia, Central America, the Mediterranean, and South East Asia stemmed the tide of Soviet Expansion and allowed other elements of national power to work on weakening the foe from within. In essence, and as will be described in our FID section, the military, through non-conventional operations (FID and UW) set the conditions to secure the United States on the global non-conventional battlefield, thus allowing a comprehensive foreign policy to engage.

While conventional forces could definitely "secure" the battlefield as well, the cost of deployment, foreseeable mis-utilization of skills, and consistent public scrutiny, would mire the political landscape to such a degree that the simplest tactical maneuver of forces would have to pass a public "sniff test." Witness the current debate of surge forces to Iraq.

The Pew Global Attitudes Survey, June 13 2006 shows that in 9 out of the 10 countries that had data from 2002 and 2006 there was a downturn in a favorable opinion of the U.S.<sup>35</sup> U.S. citizens also continue to have dissatisfaction with the Nation's direction, 63% of Americans polled are dissatisfied.<sup>36</sup> A sample of some of the American polls, provided by PollingReport.com, regarding terrorism show U.S. disapproval.<sup>37</sup>

Congress is debating passing a bill showing a lack of support for the President and the War in Iraq. Some recent Washington Post headlines show a snapshot of the internal debate about the U.S. involvement in Iraq.

- "Bush's Iraq Plan Meets Skepticism On Capitol Hill: Opposition to Troop Increase Is Bipartisan."<sup>38</sup>
- "For GOP, Discord In Dissent On Iraq: Senators With Doubts Over Bush Troop Plan Debate 5 Resolutions."<sup>39</sup>
- "Senators Unite On Challenge to Bush's Troop Plan: Revised Warner Language That Protects Funds Is Embraced for Bipartisan Appeal."<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> "America's Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas: No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China," *pewglobal.org*, 13 June 2006 [Website]; available from <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2007.

<sup>36</sup> Lydia Saas, "Americans Remain Disgruntled with Nation's Direction: By contrast, majorities are satisfied with direction of state and local affairs," *The Gallup Poll*, 22 January 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.galluppoll.com/content/default.aspx?ci=26215>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2007.

<sup>37</sup> 1/17-18/07 Newsweek Poll "...Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush is handling terrorism and homeland security?" 53% disapprove, 43% approve, and 6% unsure. 1/12-14/07 USA Today/Gallup Poll "Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling terrorism?" 52% disapprove, 46% approve, and 3 % unsure. 1/11/07 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll "Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. bush is handling terrorism?" 50% disapprove, 47% approve, and 3% unsure. 1/1-3/07 CBS News Poll "Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the campaign against terrorism?" 51% disapprove, 43% approve, and 6% unsure. Polls cited from "War on Terrorism," *PollingReport.com*, 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm>; Internet; accessed 1 May 2007.

<sup>38</sup> Michael Abramowitz and Jonathan Weisman, "Bush's Iraq Plan Meets Skepticism On Capitol Hill: Opposition to Troop Increase Is Bipartisan," *washingtonpost.com*, 12 January 2007 [Website]; available from [http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011100437\\_pf.html](http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011100437_pf.html); Internet; accessed 12 February 2007.

<sup>39</sup> Jonathan Weisman and Shailagh Murray, "For GOP, Discord In Dissent On Iraq: Senators With Doubts Over Bush Troop Plan Debate 5 Resolutions," *washingtonpost.com*, 31 January 2007 [Website]; available from [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/30/AR2007013000456\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/30/AR2007013000456_pf.html); Internet; accessed 12 February 2007.

<sup>40</sup> Shailagh Murray and Jonathan Weisman, "Senators Unite On Challenge to Bush's Troop Plan: Revised Warner Language That Protects Funds Is Embraced for Bipartisan Appeal," *washingtonpost.com*, 1 February 2007 [Website]; available from [http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/29/AR2007012900164\\_pf.html](http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/29/AR2007012900164_pf.html); Internet; accessed 12 February 2007.

- “GOP Stalls Debate On Troop Increase: Democrats Fall Short On War Resolution.”<sup>41</sup>
- “Senate Leaders Continue Squabbling Over Iraq: Little Progress Made on Nonbinding Resolution Against White House Plan to Add 21,500 troops.”<sup>42</sup>
- “7 GOP Senators Back War Debate: Lawmakers Had Blocked Action on Troop Resolution.”<sup>43</sup>

To fight the GWOT is going to require not only the support of the American people, but of the world. The U.S. needs to change its strategy to bolster that support.

## **2. Operational Environment**

The dominant future form of the GWOT will likely be a protracted, indirect and clandestine fight in scores countries with which the US is not at war.

--Michael G. Vickers<sup>44</sup>

A sampling of the current operational environment shows that it is diverse. The U.S. is conducting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. In addition the State Department list 42 known terrorist groups on its Foreign Terrorist Organizations that are spread around the globe. The terrorist organizations and concern groups affiliated/linked/associated to al Qaeda are believed to operate in at least 27 countries around the globe.<sup>45</sup>

Within Iraq, coalition forces are conducting Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in an increasingly violent country. According to the Iraqi Study group, the violence stems from “the Sunni Arab insurgency, al Qaeda and

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<sup>41</sup> Jonathan Weisman and Shailagh Murray, “GOP Stalls Debate on Troop Increase: Democrats Fall Short On War Resolution,” *washingtonpost.com*, 6 February 2007 [Website]; available from [http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/05/AR2007020500675\\_pf.html](http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/05/AR2007020500675_pf.html); Internet; accessed 12 February 2007.

<sup>42</sup> Shailagh Murray and Paul Kane, “Senate Leaders Continue Squabbling Over Iraq: Little Progress Made on Nonbinding Resolution Against White House Plan to Add 21,500 Troops,” *washingtonpost.com*, 7 February 2007 [Website]; available from [http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/06/AR2007020600553\\_pf.html](http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/06/AR2007020600553_pf.html); Internet; accessed 12 February 2007.

<sup>43</sup> Shailagh Murray, “7 GOP Senators Back War Debate: Lawmakers Had Blocked Action on Troop Resolution,” *washingtonpost.com*, 8 February 2007 [Website]; available from [http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020702550\\_pf.html](http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020702550_pf.html); Internet; accessed 12 February 2007.

<sup>44</sup> Michael G. Vickers, “Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems,” *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, 15 March 2006, 2.

<sup>45</sup> United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005*, 183-262.



affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death squads, and organized criminality.”<sup>46</sup> Sectarian violence is caused by Sunni insurgent attacks on Shia civilians which in turn lead to reprisal attacks by Shiite militias on Sunni civilians.<sup>47</sup> Two notable Shiite militias within Iraq are the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade.<sup>48</sup> The Badr Brigade has ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The insurgency and sectarian violence continue to undermine the Iraqi governments’ efforts for stability in Iraq.

Within Afghanistan there are two ongoing military operations, Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-commanded International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).<sup>49</sup> “*Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF) is a combat operation led by the United States against Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants, primarily in the eastern and southern parts of the country along the Pakistan border.”<sup>50</sup> The purpose of the ISAF is the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan.<sup>51</sup> ISAF is comprised of 35,440 personnel from 36 nations.<sup>52</sup> The year 2006 saw an increase in violence in Afghanistan with a resurgence of the Taliban in southwest Afghanistan.<sup>53</sup> “Insurgent tactics and operations against Coalition forces continue to evolve, and some maintain that they are becoming increasingly like the tactics employed in Iraq.”<sup>54</sup>

Although the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) left Basilan Island two years after counter insurgency operations began, the U.S. military continues to work with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).<sup>55</sup> Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P)

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<sup>46</sup> James A. Baker III et al., *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 3.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>49</sup> Paul Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 3 January 2007), CRS-1.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>52</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 14 February 2007), CRS-47.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., CRS-19-CRS-20.

<sup>54</sup> Andrew Feickert, *U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan: Issues for Congress* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 11 December 2006), CRS-7.

<sup>55</sup> Jeff McKaughan, “Pacific Warrior, Q&A: Building Capacity and Partnership Throughout the Region,” *Special Operations Technology* Volume 5 Issue 2, 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1950>; Internet; accessed 3 May 2007.

continues to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines in counterterrorism activities.<sup>56</sup> Due to the transnational nature of the enemy U.S. operations have expanded to Indonesia and Malaysia with joint exercises and events.<sup>57</sup>

When Ethiopia invaded Somalia in late 2006, the U.S. saw that as an opportunity to expand the GWOT and strike at al Qaeda terrorists residing in Somalia. The U.S. appeared to have conducted a surgical strike versus a more long-term presence. On 7 January 2007 “a U.S. Air Force AC-130 gunship attacked suspected al-Qaeda members in southern Somalia”.<sup>58</sup> In addition to the attack the Navy repositioned a carrier and other surface ships to prevent al-Qaeda from fleeing Somalia by sea.<sup>59</sup> At the time of this writing, no further attacks on targets in Somalia have occurred, although it has been reported that U.S. personnel did go into Somalia to try and confirm if the intended target of the attack was in fact killed.<sup>60</sup>

### **3. Manpower**

While the threat is diverse and appears to be infinite in nature, U.S. forces are finite. As powerful as the United States is it does not have the ability to deploy conventional military forces to every country that has a terrorism/insurgent problem. At the time of their research the Iraq Study Group estimated 141,000 U.S. service members are serving in Iraq.<sup>61</sup> It is estimated that 12,000 U.S. service members are serving in Afghanistan.<sup>62</sup> The deployments for Iraq have recently been increased to 15 months with a year back home before deployment again. Additionally the U.S. has forces in Kosovo,

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<sup>56</sup> McKaughan.

<sup>57</sup> David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, 26-27.

<sup>58</sup> Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Strike in Somalia Targets Al-Qaeda Figure,” *washingtonpost.com*, 8 January 2007 [Website]; available from [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/08/AR2007010801822\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/08/AR2007010801822_pf.html); Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Stephanie McCrummen, “U.S. troops Went Into Somalia After Raid,” *washingtonpost.com*, 12 January 2007 [Website]; available from [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011102329\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011102329_pf.html); Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

<sup>61</sup> Baker et al., 6.

<sup>62</sup> The Associate Press, “NATO Troop Numbers in Afghanistan,” *boston.com*, 5 October 2006 [Website]; available from [http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2006/10/05/nato\\_troop\\_numbers\\_in\\_afghanistan/](http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2006/10/05/nato_troop_numbers_in_afghanistan/); Internet; accessed 22 February 2007.

the Sinai, and Korea.<sup>63</sup> DoD has used National Guard Brigades to fulfill the Kosovo and Sinai commitments and to assist with duties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately this is a short-term fix, and “at some point, there will be no National Guard brigades that can be deployed without violating DoD’s mobilization standard.”<sup>64</sup>

This huge conventional commitment may or may not be sustainable. How long before soldiers are tired of rotating for a year to Iraq? Another conventional incursion like Iraq would be detrimental to the well being of the military, yet the GWOT is more than just Iraq and Afghanistan.

#### **4. Financial**

In Steven M. Kosiak’s testimony to the U.S. Senate he states that over the past six fiscal years the GWOT has cost about \$502 billion and another \$93 billion is being requested for fiscal year 2007.<sup>65</sup> “Military operations, reconstruction and other assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan account for, respectively, some \$345-375 billion and \$100 billion of this total.”<sup>66</sup>

Using a direct approach that relies upon heavily armored conventional forces increases costs. In 2006 the President requested an additional \$72.4 billion to cover GWOT costs, for the remainder of the fiscal year 2006, of which \$8.3 billion were allocated “to refurbish or replace equipment worn out or damaged through use in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.”<sup>67</sup>

As the chart below shows, following the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product spent on defense (when not

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<sup>63</sup> Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of the U.S. Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq: An Update,” (Washington DC: Office of the Director, 5 October 2005), 4.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>65</sup> Steven M. Kosiak, “The Global War on Terror (GWOT): Costs, Cost Growth and Estimating Funding Requirements,” *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment*, 7 February 2007, 2.

<sup>66</sup> Kosiak, 2.

<sup>67</sup> Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: President Requests \$72.4 billion for Global War on Terror,” *The White House*, February 16, 2006 [Website]; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060216-11.html>; Internet; accessed 22 February 2007.

involved in a conventional conflict) was around five percent.<sup>68</sup> The 2004 Federal budget deficit was \$477 Billion while the national debt was estimated at \$7.01 Trillion.<sup>69</sup> There is not enough free money available to increase the defense budget enough to expand the number of conventional military personnel.<sup>70</sup>




Figure 2. Defense Budget as a Percent of GDP. (From: FY 2007 Department of Defense Budget)<sup>71</sup>

## 5. Terminology

The Global War on Terrorism has all of the characteristics of an insurgency: protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, dispersal, the use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilization

<sup>68</sup> United States Department of Defense, "FY 2007 Department of Defense Budget," Washington DC, 6 February 2006 [briefing slide]; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/d20060206slides.pdf>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2007; 25.

<sup>69</sup> Ann McFeatters, "Federal budget deficit forecast to hit nearly \$2.4 trillion over next decade," *post-gazette*, 27 January 2004 [Website] available from <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04027/266028.stm>; Internet; accessed 3 May 2007.

<sup>70</sup> Jason Brizek and Jeff Vish, "Rethinking the GWOT: Foreign Internal Defense as a Force Multiplier," (Unpublished paper. Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006), 6.

<sup>71</sup> United States Department of Defense, "FY 2007 Department of Defense Budget," 25.

designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor; avoidance by insurgents of battlespaces [sic] where they are weak and a focus on those where they can compete, particularly the psychological and the political.<sup>72</sup>

The U.S. declared war on terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic not a strategy. The threat the U.S. is facing is actually an insurgent threat, but since the U.S. has labeled this struggle as a Global War on Terrorism, the natural implication is to hunt down, capture, and kill terrorists. Unfortunately the U.S. understanding is incorrect; this is a war against a global insurgency.

This insurgency is not a single hierarchical organization, but fragmented groups united loosely behind a common ideology.<sup>73</sup> If we simply target the terrorists, we miss the underlying supporting structure of the insurgent organization and the conditions that bring the groups their support.<sup>74</sup>

If we look at DoD's current Joint Publications and al Qaeda's goals we will see that some US documents recognize that al Qaeda is an insurgency that is using terrorism as a tactic. For instance, Joint Publication 1-02 defines an insurgency as:

An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.<sup>75</sup>

The same publication defines terrorism as:

The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.<sup>76</sup>

The State Department lists al Qaeda's goals as:

Al-Qaida's goal is to unite Muslims to fight the United States as a means of defeating Israel, overthrowing regimes it deems "non-Islamic," and

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<sup>72</sup> Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response," *The Strategic Studies Institute*, November 2004, 24-25.

<sup>73</sup> The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," (Washington DC: Executive Office of the President, September 2002), as cited in Brizek and Vish, 7.

<sup>74</sup> Brizek and Vish, 7.

<sup>75</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 22 March 2007)), 265.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 540.

expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Its eventual goal would be establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the world.<sup>77</sup>

In order to establish the caliphate al Qaeda would have to overthrow the established government of several countries, hence fitting the definition of an insurgency. Al Qaeda has resorted to terrorism in order to influence existing governments and the populations of those countries. In Bard O'Neill's insurgent classification al Qaeda would fall under the reactionary-traditionalist group, they [al Qaeda] want "to reestablish an ancient political system that they idealize as a golden age."<sup>78</sup> Al Qaeda has no standing army so the only way for it to wage any kind of warfare is through terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Bard O'Neill describes there are three types of warfare open to insurgents; terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare.<sup>79</sup> In Iraq and Afghanistan it can be argued that al Qaeda and its affiliates are waging guerrilla warfare against U.S. forces and the U.S. backed governments of those countries.

#### **D. THE THREAT**

A key consideration in developing a strategy is first defining the threat or enemy. What kind of enemy or threat is the U.S. currently facing? Colonel Thomas X. Hammes describes today's conventional threat to the U.S. as consisting of Korea, Iran, China, and unforeseen enemies.<sup>80</sup> The Department of Defense is clearly suited to fight a conventional war against Korea, Iran, China, and an unforeseen enemy, but what about terrorism? What is the global insurgent threat? The NSCT states:

...the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.

This transnational movement is not monolithic. Although al-Qaida functions as the movement's vanguard and remains, along with its affiliate groups and those inspired by them, the most dangerous present

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<sup>77</sup> United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005*, 217.

<sup>78</sup> Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 21.

<sup>79</sup> O'Neill, 33.

<sup>80</sup> Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2004), 247-254.

manifestation of the enemy, the movement is not controlled by any single individual, group, or state. What unites the movement is a common vision, a common set of ideas about the nature and destiny of the world, and a common goal of ushering in totalitarian rule. What unites the movement is the ideology of oppression, violence, and hate.<sup>81</sup>

Many believe al Qaeda is the immediate threat, “but what we have currently is a broad and diverse movement of radical Islamic militancy.”<sup>82</sup> The immediate enemy is the insurgent [unconventional] threat which is radical Islamic militancy. The radical Islamic militant threat consists of:

- Al Qaeda and radical Islamic militancy.
- The ideology of Islamic extremism.
- Terrorist Groups that are allied/linked/associated with al Qaeda.
- Other Groups not allied/linked/associated with al Qaeda.
- State sponsors of terrorism.

The combination of these elements creates a global insurgent threat.

### **1. Al Qaeda and Radical Islamic Militancy**

There is much more to al Qaeda than what most people believe or attribute to al Qaeda. Jason Burke believes people have misunderstood al Qaeda. “Bin Laden and al-Qaeda are the radical, extremist fringe of the broad movement that is modern Islamic militancy.”<sup>83</sup> Burke believes prior to 9-11 al Qaeda consisted of “three elements: a hardcore, a network of co-opted groups and an ideology.”<sup>84</sup> The hardcore were those that were loyal to bin Laden. The co-opted groups were local groups that had links to the hardcore al Qaeda. Burke uses the venture capitalists model as an analogy of how the hard core element would provide funds and resources for projects local groups would present.<sup>85</sup> “Together these links, some tenuous, some more direct, allow us to speak of a

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<sup>81</sup> The White House, “The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” 2006, 5.

<sup>82</sup> Jason Burke, *AL-QAEDA: The True Story of Radical Islam* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), XXV.

<sup>83</sup> Burke, XXV.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 12-13.

loose ‘network of networks’.”<sup>86</sup> The third element is “the idea, worldview, ideology of ‘al-Qaeda’ and those who subscribe to it.”<sup>87</sup>

With the invasion of Afghanistan al Qaeda’s safe haven was lost, the core leadership of al Qaeda was forced to disperse, and the system they had in place has been disrupted.<sup>88</sup> Personnel from the hard core element and the co-opted groups survived, but now there is more International pressure to disrupt the ‘network of networks’, yet new groups have sprung up.<sup>89</sup>

Most activism is now by individuals who look up to bin Laden as a symbolic leader but are acting in style of al-Qaeda, along the agenda of al-Qaeda but are not controlled in any meaningful way by ‘al-Qaeda’. Islamic militancy has lapsed into the chaotic variety that characterized the early nineties, except for one major factor: the efforts of Western governments, local regimes and security agencies across the world have been unable to break up the third element of al-Qaeda. The idea of ‘al-Qaeda’ – the precept, the maxim, the formula, not ‘the base’ – is more powerful than ever.<sup>90</sup>

The Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism supports Burke’s analysis of al Qaeda. The report says, “AQ’s core leadership continues to influence and provide ideological guidance to followers worldwide.”<sup>91</sup> The same report states there is evidence that the core leaders have become frustrated by the lack of direct control and that al Qaeda’s global networks are beginning to break apart.<sup>92</sup> “What was once a relatively structured network appeared to be a more diffuse worldwide movement of like-minded individuals and small groups, sharing grievances and objectives, but not necessarily organized formally.”<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Burke, 13.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005*, 12.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 13.



Jason Burke provides three meanings for the word al Qaeda. "It could mean...a vanguard, a base or a maxim, precept, rule or methodology."<sup>94</sup> Burke believes each definition represents a phase that Islamic militancy has evolved through.<sup>95</sup>

In the first phase, from around 1989 to around 1996, hundreds of activist who had been involved in the war against the Soviets or were fighting local struggles against regimes in the Middle East worked, often independently, at radicalizing and mobilizing those who had hitherto shunned extremism. These activists saw themselves as 'the vanguard' – 'al-qaeda al-sulbahh'.<sup>96</sup>

The second phase 'the base' was the period of bin Laden's alliance with the Taliban when al Qaeda had a safe haven in Afghanistan.<sup>97</sup> With the invasion of Afghanistan the second phase came to a close and the third phase began. The third phase corresponds with the third translation that Burke provides, "the methodology, the maxim, the precept, the rule, the way of seeing the world."<sup>98</sup> The third phase and translation are the ideology an ideology that has its roots in Islamic extremism.

## **2. The Ideology of Islamic Extremism**

A far bigger threat to the U.S. than the actual terrorist organizations is the ideology of Islamic extremism or what Marc Sageman refers to as the "Global Salafi jihad."<sup>99</sup> "The Global Salafi jihad is a worldwide religious revivalist movement with the goal of reestablishing past Muslim glory in a great Islamist state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, eliminating present international boundaries."<sup>100</sup> The Global Salafi jihad "preaches salafiyah...the restoration of authentic Islam, and advocates a strategy of violent jihad, resulting in an explosion of terror to wipe out what it regards as local political heresy."<sup>101</sup> The Global Salafi jihad ideology has its roots in Wahhabism.

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<sup>94</sup> Burke, 289-290.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 290.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 1.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

Wahhabism “is an austere form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Koran.”<sup>102</sup> Strict Wahhabis believe that all those who don't practice their form of Islam are heathens and enemies.”<sup>103</sup>

Salafiyyah and Wahhabism have been used interchangeably because they both preach a conservative version of Islam although the historical roots of each differ.<sup>104</sup> “Modern Salafi beliefs grew from a reform-oriented movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which developed in various parts of the Islamic world and progressively grew more conservative.”<sup>105</sup> “Salafis generally believe that the Quran and the Prophet’s practices (*hadith*) are the ultimate religious authority in Islam”.<sup>106</sup> Blanchard states “Salafi interpretations of Islam appeal to a large number of Muslims worldwide who seek religious renewal in the face of modern challenges.”<sup>107</sup> Wahhabism “is derived from the name of a Muslim scholar, Muhammad bin Abd al Wahhab,” who lived in the eighteenth century, Abd al Wahhab was dissatisfied with the moral decline of society.<sup>108</sup> He “encouraged a “return” to the pure and orthodox practice of the “fundamentals” of Islam, as embodied in the Quran and in the life of the Prophet Muhammad.”<sup>109</sup>

Marc Sageman postulates there are three strategies available to the Salafi: *dawa*, political activism, and Salafi jihad. “*Dawa* (call to Islam in Arabic)” “advocates individual responsibility in spreading Islam to the rest of society through one's personal proselytism to convert others.”<sup>110</sup> Political activism attempts “to change society through state organs” and has led to the creation of Salafi political parties in Egypt (Muslim

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<sup>102</sup> Koran has numerous spelling and will be spelled as such unless quoting from another source.

<sup>103</sup> “Analysis Wahhabism,” *PBS Frontline*, (n.d.) [Website]; available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/wahhabism.html>; Internet; accessed 27 February 2007.

<sup>104</sup> Christopher M. Blanchard, *The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya*. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 17 January 2007), CRS-1-CRS-3.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., CRS-3.

<sup>107</sup> Blanchard, CRS-3.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., CRS-2.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Sageman, 5.

Brotherhood) and India (Jamaat-i Islami).<sup>111</sup> The founders of these parties "advocated the creation of a true Muslim state through imposition of the Sharia, which they viewed not only as the strict Quranic law but also as the practices of the salaf."<sup>112</sup> Salafi jihad was a result of the repression by modern Muslim states.<sup>113</sup> Sageman states the justification for jihad against fellow Muslims lies in the concept of jahiliyya. Jahiliyya is "the state of barbarism and ignorance that prevailed in the Arabic Peninsula before Mohammed's revelations."<sup>114</sup>

Two figures used jahiliyya to justify waging jihad on fellow Muslims, Mohamed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (founder of Wahhabism) and Sayyid Qutb. Mohamed ibn Abd al-Wahhab allied himself with Mohamed ibn Saud (eighteenth century) and used the concept of jahiliyya to conquer the Arabian Peninsula which led to the eventual creation of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.<sup>115</sup> Abd al-Wahhab "based many of his Quranic interpretations on the fatwas of Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya".<sup>116</sup> Taymiyya stated it the was duty of Muslims to wage jihad against the Mongol rulers because the Mongols followed Genghis Khan's Yasa legal code instead of Sharia and this made them apostates. In recent history Mawdudi (founder of Jamaat-i Islami) "resurrected the concept of jahiliyya in his writings as an abstract term to describe the system of beliefs and ideas of the times in India."<sup>117</sup> Sageman goes on to say,

Qutb took both Ibn Taymiyya's duty to wage jihad against apostates and Mawdudi's concept of jahiliyya out of context and combined them in a novel way, extending Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's ideas even further.

Sayyid Qutb's influence on the Salafi jihad in general was crucial. Afghan resistance leaders like Burnhanuddin Rabbani, who translated his works into Dari, were his disciples. Some of the founders of al Qaeda--Ayman

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<sup>111</sup> Sageman, 6.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 9.

al-Zawahiri, Ali Amin Ali al-Rashidi, and Subhi Muhammad Abu Sittah--were Egyptian disciples who had sought refuge from political persecution in the Afghan jihad.<sup>118</sup>

Qutb's interpretation helped to promote a violent radical ideology. It is this ideology that helps give rise to new groups and creates a global threat.

### **3. Terrorist Groups that are Allied/Linked/Associated with Al Qaeda**

The State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005 lists several terrorist organizations and groups of concern that are allied/linked/associated/sympathetic with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. These groups would fall into Jason Burke's co-opted groups' category. These terrorist organizations are:

- Ansar al-Sunna (AS): Iraq.
- Asbat al-Ansar: Lebanon.
- Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG): Egypt, U.K., Afghanistan, Yemen, and Europe.
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.
- Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI): Indonesia, Malaysia, & Philippines.
- Al-Jihad (AJ): historically Egypt, but primarily operate outside of Egypt in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and Yemen.<sup>119</sup>
- Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT): Pakistan.<sup>120</sup>
- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG): Libya, believed to have spread to Asia, African, European, and Persian Gulf countries.
- Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM): Morocco, Western Europe, Canada, and Afghanistan.
- Al-Qaida in Iraq: Middle East, North Africa, Iran, South Asia, and Europe.
- Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC): Algeria, the Sahel, Canada, and Western Europe.<sup>121</sup>

The groups of concern are:

- Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr): Jammu, Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

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<sup>118</sup> Sageman, 9.

<sup>119</sup> Merged with Al-Qaeda in 2001.

<sup>120</sup> This link is circumstantial since an al Qaeda lieutenant was captured in one their safe houses.

<sup>121</sup> United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005*, 183-228.

- Al-Ittihad al-Islamic (AIAI): Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and possibly Djibouti.<sup>122</sup>
- East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM): Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
- Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI): Pakistan and Kashmir.
- Harakat-ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B): Bangladesh.
- Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG): Afghanistan.
- Islamic Army of Aden (IAA): Yemen .
- Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-C): Turkey.
- Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB): Russia, Chechnya, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey .
- Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG): Western Europe and Afghanistan.<sup>123</sup>

#### **4. Other Groups Not Allied/Linked/Associated with Al Qaeda**

The State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005 lists several terrorist organizations and groups of concern that are not allied/linked/associated/sympathetic with Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda, but are Islamic extremists groups or their ultimate goal is the establishment Islamic rule. These organizations are:

- Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG): Philippines.
- Armed Islamic Group (GIA): Algeria, Sahel, and parts of Europe.
- HAMAS: West Bank, Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Gulf States.
- Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM): Pakistan.
- Hizballah: Lebanon, Europe, North and South America, Asia, and Africa.
- Islamic Jihad Group (IJU): Central and South Asia.
- Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM): Pakistan.
- Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ): anti-Shia group in Pakistan.
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ): Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Syria.<sup>124</sup>

The following are the groups of concern are:

- Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM): Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistan.
- Jamaatul-Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB): Bangladesh.

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<sup>122</sup> Former members have supported al-Qaeda.

<sup>123</sup> United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005*, 229-262.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 183-228.

- Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (KMM): Indonesia and Malaysia.
- People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD): South Africa.
- Raja Solaiman Movement (RSM): Philippines.
- Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM): Russia.
- Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP): anti-Shia group in Pakistan.
- Turkish Hizballah: Turkey.<sup>125</sup>

## **5. State Sponsors of Terrorism**

State sponsors are a concern because they can act as support organizations providing resources and safe haven to the groups of the radical Islamic movement. The current State sponsors of terrorism consist of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.<sup>126</sup> As the GWOT has been waged the list has changed. Libya's cooperation with the U.S. has seen its name removed from the list. Current negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program are leading the U.S. to begin the process of removing North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list.<sup>127</sup> There might be cases, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, of non-state sponsors having competing governance within the state that may provide support to terrorists.

As was mentioned earlier, today's threat is both conventional and unconventional therefore any strategy developed to combat the GWOT should be sustainable and be able to counter a conventional threat while fighting the unconventional threat. This concludes our analysis of the GWOT problem and some of the constraints and limitations surrounding the problem. The next chapter will examine the "Cold War" and how it relates to the terrorist threat today.

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<sup>125</sup> United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005*, 229-262.

<sup>126</sup> "State Sponsors of Terrorism," *U.S. Department of State*, (n.d.) [Website]; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2007.

<sup>127</sup> "North Korea: An Important First Step," *U.S. Department of State*, 20 February 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/80575.htm>; Internet; accessed 26 February 2007.

### **III. WHAT LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM PARALLELS BETWEEN THE COLD WAR AND THE GWOT/LONG WAR**

To fully understand the current global insurgent threat, we again look to the lessons of the Cold War. As mentioned before, the extent to which conventional forces were employed with success on the conventional battlefield pales in relative comparison to the extent of which non-conventional forces were strategically deployed in order to set the global conditions against the spread of Communism. By briefly analyzing the irregular conduct of the Cold War, and the similarities of the current “War” on terror, we can conclude consistencies in the nature of the threat, operational methods, and hopefully a more effective counterinsurgency strategy.

During the Cold War, the United States fought the U.S.S.R., and its communist expansion primarily on the irregular battlefields i.e., Guatemala, Afghanistan, Greece, by bankrolling and “out-sourcing” U.S. support via hardware, logistics, money, and ideology to counter and contain communism. By supporting either susceptible states with Foreign Internal Defense, or backing insurgency with unconventional warfare, the U.S. basically countered communism on a country by country, case by case situation. Sometimes military advisors and State Department support were required, as in the case of El Salvador;<sup>128</sup> sometimes the CIA/SF fought the UW conflict, as exemplified by actions in Iran, 1953, with the success of Operation AJAX - the agencies first foray and success in overthrowing an established power.<sup>129</sup> Either way, one can see that the only time when Communism and the U.S. fought on the conventional battlefield, stalemate or defeat ensued (Korea, Vietnam) and that the United States only defeated Soviet backed communist expansion with irregular conflict. One can conclude that while the U.S. prepared for conventional conflict, to include war on a nuclear battlefield, such a broad “U.S. vs. U.S.S.R.” conventional fight never occurred because neither country would nor could invade the other. It can then be surmised, in the light of predominant conflict of

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<sup>128</sup> Cecil Bailey, “OPATT: The US Army SF Advisors in El Salvador,” *Special Warfare* Volume 17, Issue 2, (December 2004): 18.

<sup>129</sup> John Pados, *Presidents’ Secret Wars*, (Chicago: Elephant Press, 1996), 96.

the Cold War era, and understanding the collective effect of managing elements of national power with indirect means, that the balance of power, rested in nuclear parity, prevented such a face off.<sup>130</sup>

We assert that the same holds true with the U.S. fight against global Islamic insurgency and exported support. While not solidly represented by a monolithic evil that was the U.S.S.R., the same concepts and lessons can be applied to a common Islamic Jihad movement, not so popularly shunned by a moderate population, as the West might want to believe. As referenced above, similarities will illuminate a reality that conventional U.S. conquest, against a state, state sponsored threat, or non-state actor, may be neither possible nor efficient, and that the only way to effectively fight a non-conventional opponent (that is, no armies in the field) is with irregular action.

The end of WWII saw the globe dominated by two superpowers vying for control over war-depleted, post-colonial environment. It was in this beginning that scholars contend “the Soviet Union and countries within its sphere of influence [had] been training members of underground movements from various countries in the techniques of terrorism and guerrilla warfare.”<sup>131</sup> Such action stands as direct product of Soviet policy and motives for supporting insurgencies and international terrorism. Pragmatically, the U.S.S.R. used such support as a substitute for conventional warfare.

As the implements of modern warfare grow evermore expensive and in view of the enormous destruction that would accompany a conflict involving the major contenders for world power, that is to say the United States and the Soviet Union, there has been a marked shift in the postwar period on the part of the Soviet Union to the employment of surrogate or “proxy” forces to test the resolve of the West and to put pressure on the noncommunist world without running the risk of all out war.<sup>132</sup>

They also saw insurgency and the tactic of terrorism as a destabilizing weapon to use against Western regimes. Western countries would likely devote more of their budgets to internal security, and subsequently redirect the focus of their conventional militaries

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<sup>130</sup> Walter LaFaber, *America Russia and the Cold War: 1945-1992*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993), 287-328.

<sup>131</sup> Shlomi Elad and Ariel Merari, *The Soviet Bloc and World Terrorism*, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University (Paper No. 26, August 1984), 12.

<sup>132</sup> Elad and Merari, 49, quoting N.L. Livingstone, “Terrorism: The International Connection,” *Army*, (December 1980).



away from NATO and its role of defending against the U.S.S.R.<sup>133</sup> Ideologically; the Soviet Union maintained the responsibility to support wars of national liberation. This is expressed specifically in the constitution of 1977 in paragraph 28:

The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring the international conditions favorable for building communism in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world socialism, *supporting the struggle peoples for national liberation and social progress* [italics added by author], preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.<sup>134</sup>

As a method of execution, the Soviets were mostly non-kinetic in their influence. However, this is not to say that the Soviets were not heavy handed in their approach to “nation building.” While the United States had to operate within transparent parameters, the U.S.S.R. had no such limitations and often times handled insurgency with direct conventional application. Examples ranging from revolutionary suppression in Eastern Europe in the early stages of the Cold War, i.e. Czechoslovakia<sup>135</sup>, to its final capitulation in Afghanistan<sup>136</sup>, the Russian Bear never shied from forceful execution. However, outside their empire in Eastern Europe, the Soviets pursued indirect engagement in most locations where they opposed the USA and its allies. As cited above, we can see the official stance the Soviets took with their emphasis on fomenting insurgency as a means of indirectly affecting the United States. Few examples of direct military involvement against the United States occurred in the skies over Korea, but most commonly the U.S.S.R. provided some sort of support to insurgencies battling for control against a capitalist, western inspired government. Soviet FID against western democratic powers included aid to Cuba following their revolution, and to North Vietnam. The

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<sup>133</sup> Elad and Merari, 50.

<sup>134</sup> H.A. Almond, “The Legal Regulation of International Terrorism,” *Conflict*, vol.3, no. 2/3 (1981): 144-165, referencing *Pravda*, 8 October, 1977, 3, quoted in Shlomi Elad and Ariel Merari, *The Soviet Bloc and World Terrorism*, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University (Paper No. 26, August 1984), 60.

<sup>135</sup> “Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, 27 April 2005 [Website]; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/czechoslovakia2.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 May 2007.

<sup>136</sup> Robert F. Baumann, “Compound War Case Study: Soviets In Afghanistan,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, 27 April 2005 [Website]; available from [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/soviet-afghan\\_compound-warfare.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/soviet-afghan_compound-warfare.htm); Internet; accessed 21 May 2007.

U.S.S.R. was not limited to supporting fledgling communist nation states. To wit, Elad and Merari list the different modes of support in creating a terrorist infrastructure to include: numerous examples of Soviet backed training programs around the globe; testimonies detailing the level and type of armament provided (note simply the distribution of the AK-47 and its symbolic representation of wars of liberation); the means of logistics and coordination; and distribution of propaganda with overt and covert encouragement to the insurgencies in the form of black and white PSYOPs.<sup>137</sup>

In essence, the U.S.S.R. executed what amounts to Soviet sponsored FID and UW. From such Soviet action, the U.S. alternative was to combat this non-conventional foe on the irregular battlefield, which the U.S. did with success. Some examples for the United States and its application of non-kinetic military and political counteraction to Communist expansion include: Greece 1947<sup>138</sup>; Poland in the 1980's; South Vietnam and the success over the Vietcong in 1968 through successful programs such as the CIDG, the Phoenix Program, the Marine CORDS initiative and other counterinsurgent activities; direct support of UW in supplying Mujahadeen Afghan forces with Stinger missiles and training in the 1980's; and support to various Central American irregular operations to stem the tide of Communism under the Reagan administration. While conventional Soviet COIN forces proved successful, the same cannot be said for the US conventional COIN operations. When the U.S. used conventional force for non-conventional conflict, the results are less than optimal because of a reluctance to fully crush an insurgent foe and their mechanisms of support. It is only when the U.S. exercises its indirect capabilities that true counteraction vis a vis communist expansion was effective.

It can be surmised then that while ideologically and pragmatically motivated, Soviet support to up and coming Communists was primarily fueled by armament, funds, and training. The U.S. did not, as a matter of course, directly intercept shipments of weapons, specifically target command and control nodes, launch SOF led direct action raids around the globe against guerrilla bases, nor launch multiple High Value Target

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<sup>137</sup> Elad and Merari, 12-37.

<sup>138</sup> "Greek Civil War," *GlobalSecurity.org*, 27 April 2005 [Website]; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/greek.htm>; Internet; access 21 May 2007.

roundup operations to stem the tide of communist influence (all of which DoD seemingly conduct as a matter of priority against a similar adversary today.) What did occur was an indirect engagement on a global level to 1.) Safeguard allied or fledgling governments against communist inception, and 2.) Make capitalism a more profitable and appealing way of life. Neither option occurred at the tip of an infantryman's bayonet nor by simply funding that Host Nation government, but by engaging the situation at a local level with an understanding of leveraging the appropriate elements of national power required to influence the population away from the communist insurgents and towards the legitimate government. Most of the examples above include Foreign Internal Defense operations, but as some situations required the opposite engagement, U.S. sponsored Unconventional Warfare, to either weaken the occupying communist force or topple the communist government, was employed.

The similarities to the Soviet Union's use of exported conflict and the rise of radical Islamic Insurgency are striking to a point of easy comparison. While not represented by a monolithic empire, like the U.S.S.R., Radical Islam exports its ideology, training, funding, and armament much in the same manner...by fueling local insurgencies against western allies or interests. Again, we recognize a lack of any singular Nation State backing or sponsoring all radical Islamic Insurgency, but one can note a common organizational mechanism, in the form of common ideology in diasporas, and a core of non-state actors indirectly fueled by state governance.

We again summarize the basic concept of exported radical Islam and its war against the west. Either from a national power or from a transnational non-state actor both maintains the concept of exporting conservative Islamic ideology and material to bring down the power base of western, liberal democracies, in order to solidify their own base of power. While the mechanisms of support remain respective to the levels that can be provided from such sources, the extent to which such support towards identified local insurgencies or elements of an Islamic population, meets if not bypasses the relative affect of similar western backed efforts. In a paper written for the 2006 ISA Conference, Michael Freeman notes emphatically the massive effort to export conservative Wahhabi

Islam and Iranian backed Shia revolution since the late 1970's.<sup>139</sup> We can draw similar parallels with analysis towards these two such sources.

The first source is that of the non-state actor. While al Qaeda found its ideological and material roots with the original spread of fundamentalist Islam, this global organization has franchised itself to supporting insurgencies at the local level to achieve its stated goals. These goals, in essence rally such support and coalescence at the global level. Primarily then, it is this ideology that is the largest effective export that builds and binds fledgling Islamic insurgencies.

Al Qaeda, or "the Base," draws its strength from the ties developed during the 1980's Afghan War against the Soviets. Muslims from all over the Middle East, South, and South East Asia birthed the first real jihad to protect Islamic interests from infidel invasion.<sup>140</sup> The call banded together a strongly Wahhabist indoctrinated, well funded, and well trained group of zealots. It is these zealots, who, once returned to their homelands, or stayed in Afghanistan to bask in the glory of the Taliban, took up the jihadi, separatist cause against their local governments (such as in the Philippines under Abu Sayyeff) or continued the struggle against infidels (Bosnia, Chechnya). The proclamations and unification of these local jihadi movements, by the calls from Osama bin Laden, effectively solidified the global movement against the west, and western supported "Apostate" governments to meet the goals of renewing traditional Muslim lands under righteous Sharia law, and reduce the influence of the decadent forces currently infecting Moslem populations.

While al Qaeda originally provided the funding, command and control, and training of would-be insurgents as a primary means of spreading their influence, via terror tactics against their belligerents, counter-actions since 9/11 have reduced such direct support provided by al Qaeda. That violent act of 9/11 stemmed as a direct result of such direct support in planning, funding, training and coordination. Once noted by the United States and her allies, direct engagement effectively curtailed al Qaeda's mechanisms. However, while bringing attack and scrutiny on their operational

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<sup>139</sup> Michael Freeman, "The Rise of Islamic Extremist Terrorist: A Look at the Supply of an Ideology," (Unpublished paper for the 2006, ISA Conference, San Diego, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006).

<sup>140</sup> Freeman, 10.

capabilities, the attack of 9/11 energized a disenfranchised segment of the Muslim population with a strike against the nation that represented to them not only decadent influence, but an indirect if not direct oppressor. Local insurgencies, especially those lead by former Mujahadeen were able to capitalize on the concepts and ideology of al Qaeda. It is this franchise concept that ties what could be simply local conflagrations to a global struggle.

Added to the now non-state supported radical Islamic insurgency of al Qaeda is the direct support and influence of Nation-State actors. As mentioned previously, the Department of State lists five Nations as state sponsors to terrorism. Two states responsible for the exportation of radical Islam are Iran (Shia) and Saudi Arabia (Sunni). Saudi Arabia is not a state sponsor of terrorism, but Iran is officially recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism.

As previously discussed the ideology of the Global Salafi jihad poses a threat, but it is not being exported by a state. Wahhabism is being exported by Saudi Arabia. Blanchard reports

Since its emergence, Wahhabism's puritanical and iconoclastic philosophies have resulted in conflict with other Muslim groups. Wahhabism opposes most popular Islamic religious practices such as saint veneration, the celebration of the Prophet's birthday, most core Shiite traditions, and some practices associated with the mystical teachings of Sufism. In the past, this has brought Wahhabis based in the Arabian peninsula and elsewhere into confrontation with non-Wahhabi Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, and non-Muslims in neighboring areas.<sup>141</sup>

The ties between the ruling Saudi monarchy and Wahhabist religious doctrine bind such global influence to state resources. Events from the 1960's through the 1980's intensified the Wahhabification of Saudi Arabia to a degree, that when emboldened by the funding and influence of oil revenue, exportation and radical conversion in other Muslim populations became paramount. This, done in order to safeguard the monarchy's own legitimacy at home, and to role back the influence of Shia revolutions of the 1970's.<sup>142</sup> In essence, money and ideology were exported to carry out conservative

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<sup>141</sup> Blanchard, CRS-2.

<sup>142</sup> Freeman, 8.

Muslim doctrine. As surmised by Freeman, “the result was the exporting on an industrial scale of Wahhabi, Salafi, neo-traditionalist or ‘hard’ Islam,” and that, in effect, “in Southeast Asia, Saudi and Gulf funds transformed a tolerant, Sufi-style Islam into an extremist, ‘hard’ –style of Salafi Islam,”<sup>143</sup> giving birth to Osama bin Laden, et al. Carried to a logical sequence of events, funding for ideological education amongst a population ripe for insurgency, is easily transformed into money for weapons, supplies, and training.

As mentioned, on the Shia side of fundamentalist exportation stands Iran and the Islamic revolution. As Sunni support to fundamentalist Islam took the direct form of ideology, religious education and indoctrination, and money, the Iranians simply added to the capabilities of already established insurgent groups. This state sponsored proliferation of radical, anti-western Islam was, and remains a consistent aspect of Iranian foreign policy. “The 9/11 Commission Report” reveals multiple ties from Iran to al-Qaeda to Hizballah that alone demonstrates a connection to global insurgent terrorism.<sup>144</sup> The same can be surmised, as done by Geoffrey Gresh writing for The Fletcher School of Tufts University, for other ties to practically anywhere there is Islamic Insurgency, as has been policy since 1979:

Its principal themes included a belief in the revolution’s exportability; a commitment , at least in the early years of the revolution, to altering the nature of the regimes in the Persian Gulf and the regional balance of power; a conviction that certain aspects of Western culture were threatening to Iran’s cultural and national identity; a suspicion of Western, and particularly American, intentions toward Iran; a revolutionary ideology that attached value to a truculent, muscular posture in

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<sup>143</sup> Jason Burke, *AL-QAEDA: The True Story of Radical Islam* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 230, paraphrased by Freeman, 9.

<sup>144</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of The National Commission on Terrorists Attacks upon the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, (n.d.), 2004), 50-51, 240.

international relations...and a willingness to use unconventional means, including assassination and hostage taking, to achieve foreign policy ends.<sup>145</sup>

Such indirect influence is further elucidated by Iran's sponsorship and support of insurgent terrorist activities in Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Argentina.<sup>146</sup> As such, Iran exemplifies this Islamic Revolutionary irregular warfare with such an extensive FID/UW version of their own, and supporting infrastructure as reflected by the allocation of moneys to the charitable foundations established by Khomeini, and by the activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Special Forces.<sup>147</sup> Such have been known to establish and sponsor camps within Iran and Lebanon, and also in South Africa and the Sudan providing sanctuary, training, and weapons.

In all cases of external support from established nation states – unofficially from Saudi Arabia with exported education and ideology as a primary tool of influence, and officially from recognized terror sponsors exemplified primarily by Iranian efforts – and support by non-state global actors rallying Islamic insurgency to the jihadi cause under the al Qaeda banner, the common note that stands obvious but seemingly overlooked by U.S. strategists, is the similar operational methods of the United States' former global competitor...the Soviet Union.

A simple review reveals the parallels of the United States' actions vis-à-vis those of the former Soviet Union, and those that should be taken with the current threat of global Islamic Insurgency. The U.S.S.R. never put a military force in the field to directly confront the United States or its allies. On both sides, the only mechanism of engagement was through the indirect means of engagement on the behalf of respective interests. The U.S. effectively engaged communism through the use of non-kinetic

<sup>145</sup> Shaul Bakhash, "Iran's Foreign Policy Under the Islamic Republic, 1979-2000," *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 251-252, quoted in Geoffrey Gresh, "Instigating Instability: Iran's Support of Non-State Armed Groups in Iraq," *The Fletcher School Online Journal for Issues Related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization*, (The Fletcher School: Tufts University, Spring, 2006), 2 [journal online]; available from [http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al\\_nakhlah/archives/spring2006/gresh.pdf](http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/spring2006/gresh.pdf); Internet accessed 3 May 2007, citing.

<sup>146</sup> Shaul Shay, *The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror*, (United States: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 42.

<sup>147</sup> Gresh, 3.

military operations, and exercising the influence over the remaining elements of national power to affect the target population of local conflicts over separatist, or national ideologies. Predominant military action took place not on the battlefield, but on the national, or “improvised” training grounds to help U.S. allied nations defend themselves from communist inception, or encourage insurgency against communist regimes. Countering Soviet moves on a case by case and country specific scenario allowed other non-kinetic engagement strategies to erode the Soviet’s capability to succeed as a global belligerent. Again, note the lack of conventional forces on the field of battle; note the emphasis on battling for control over the population with a pushed ideology and violently supported insurgent activity at a global scale. The United States defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War by winning the battle of ideology in contested areas, and by forcefully backing allied Host Nations or recognized “freedom fighters,” predominantly through indirect means utilizing non-kinetic special operations. When US conventional forces were deployed to affect a non-conventional battle, quagmire and defeat ensued. A re-examination of past success, bearing in mind the force structure and mission emphasis, will prove fruitful given current application.

This concludes our examination of the Cold War and what lessons can be drawn from it that are applicable to the situation facing the U.S. today. In the next chapter we will lay out a proposed strategy for the GWOT.



#### IV. NON-CONVENTIONAL INTERDICTION STRATEGY<sup>148</sup>

No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

--John F. Kennedy<sup>149</sup>

This war requires the U.S. military to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches...With its allies and partners, the United States must be prepared to wage this war in many locations simultaneously and for some years to come.<sup>150</sup>

Having established the nature of the threat facing the entire globe, and the relational ties to the methods of execution during the Cold War, we can now realistically apply a framework of operational strategy for the Department of Defense. Realizing that a global security strategy for the United States would naturally include implementation of all governmental agencies and their applications toward U.S. elements of national power, we also acknowledge the degree to which the DoD will have to synchronize and coordinate operational efforts.

From the quotes beginning this chapter, we reflect upon Kennedy's prophetic vision of protracted future conflict. True then as it is now, and echoed by the 2006 QDR, conflict in the present and in the future will not revolve primarily around the massive

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<sup>148</sup> The structure for the Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy grew out a paper by Glenn Johnson, Carl Morris, and David Sears, "Global War on Terrorism Ground Special Operation Forces Foreign Internal Defense Strategy," (Unpublished paper, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006).

<sup>149</sup> John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, "John F. Kennedy, Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy," The American Presidency Project (n.d.) [Website]; available from <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=8695>; Internet; accessed 3 May 2007.

<sup>150</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 1.

engagement of armies in the field, or between an exchange of nuclear armament, but will be relegated to the deterrent or preemptive actions of irregular, non-conventional engagement. As we illustrated in the previous chapter, the threat the U.S. faces is a transnational network that has ties to other networks and operates much like classic insurgencies of the past. This Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy proposes to establish a DoD structure, similar to a network, which would operate around the world assisting partner countries to combat insurgencies, punish nation states that support insurgencies that use terrorism, and interdict key insurgent leaders.

In Richard Yarger's piece *Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model*, Yarger presents Art Lykke's three-legged stool model for strategy.<sup>151</sup> The stool model was used in the development of the Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy. Employing Lykke's model will ensure DoD has a balanced strategy that is complementary to the current National Security Strategy. The Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy uses the existing objectives of current strategy, proposes using a new concept to meet those objectives, and examines the means to be used.

#### **A. OBJECTIVES (ENDS)**

In order to effectively develop the Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy the objectives out of the following documents were reviewed: the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 2006), National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September 2006), National Defense Strategy (March 2005), and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (1 February 2006). The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2004) was reviewed, but its overarching objectives were not related to the GWOT. Any proposed Department of Defense strategy must be nested with current U.S. National Strategy.

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<sup>151</sup> Richard H. Yarger, "Towards a theory of strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model," [Website]; available from <http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm>; Internet; accessed 1 May 2007. The stool concept is a very simplified way to look at strategy. Yarger states "in the Lykke model the ends are objectives, the ways are the concepts for accomplishing the objectives, and the means are the resources for supporting the concepts." Each leg of the stool represents either the objectives (ends), concepts (ways), or resources (means). Each leg must be of equal length (importance) to maintain the balance and minimize risk.

In the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 2006) the President list the following objectives:

- Champion aspirations for human dignity.
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.
- Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.
- Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
- Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.<sup>152</sup>

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September 2006) list the following short-term objectives:

- Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism.
- Prevent attacks by terrorist networks.
- Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them.
- Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states.
- Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.<sup>153</sup>

The National Defense Strategy (March 2005) list the following objectives:

- Secure the United States from direct attack.
- Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.
- Strengthen alliances and partnerships.

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<sup>152</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington DC: Executive Office of the President, March 2006), 1.

<sup>153</sup> The White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, 1.

- Establish favorable security conditions.<sup>154</sup>

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) dated 1 February 2006. The NMSP-WOT list the following objectives:

- Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive.
- Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.
- Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials and increase capacity for consequence management.
- Defeat terrorists and their organizations.
- Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations.
- Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.<sup>155</sup>

The Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy uses the current objectives, but recommends a different ways and means to be used to achieve the objectives.

## **B. CONCEPTS (WAYS)**

We can better understand this proposed strategy by first analyzing the deterrent nature of FID, which will also be then applied as the primary component of the entire concept. Foreign Internal Defense, currently as a matter of U.S. application, is committed to countries or regions in which U.S. allies could benefit from the assistance of the United States in all matters of national power. As such, when applied to a certain country, specific circumstances of that country dictate the type and level of support required to assist in safeguarding from internal or external threats. It is our contention that the same analytical process that is used to employ DoD as part of a FID operation at a national level can be used to address the security concerns of the U.S. at a global level. FID, from this perspective would identify the type and intensity of application. At the national level, in certain countries, when broken down by districts or regions, security may be tantamount in one area necessitating direct military action, while economic aid and development may be required in another. Some areas may be controlled by a local despot and need to be overthrown; others may simply need a diplomatic intervention by

<sup>154</sup> United States Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2005), iv.

<sup>155</sup> United States Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, 6-7.

an assisted representative of the central government. The same perspective can be applied on a global scale, but instead of analyzing the specific requirement of state districts within a country, the U.S. would expand its purview so now the whole country becomes the focus of the analysis for the type and level of engagement that the U.S. would commit to not only help that country protect itself from lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency, but also prevent such local conflicts from spilling over, or coalescing with other national conflicts, by intervening with U.S. sponsored UW or even Direct Engagement (DE) strikes.



Figure 3. Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy

The Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy proposes a DoD structure that will use the concepts of Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, and Direct Engagement. The DoD structure to implement the FID concept on a global scale would consist of four types of nodes and two types of hubs. The nodes would either be one of three action elements or an intelligence element. The nodes could be used either offensively or defensively. Offensive operations would be proactive or preemptive while defensive operations would be in response to a hostile act upon the U.S.

The action nodes of the network would consist of, three types of non-conventional forces, a FID force, a UW force, and a Direct Engagement (DE) force. These three units are the action arms of the strategy. The CIA could fulfill the role of the intelligence node of the structure, but in order to minimize the need for interagency coordination and to keep the strategy within DoD the intelligence node would use Josh Walker and Eric Deal's Special Forces Global Counter-Insurgent Network (SFGCIN) concept.<sup>156</sup> The SFGCIN nodes would collect intelligence and information in particular countries with the SFGCIN hubs providing host nation command and control for any FID force assigned to

<sup>156</sup> Joshua H. Walker and Eric J. Deal, "Optimizing Army Special Forces Leaders in a Global Counter-Insurgency Network," (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007).

that particular host nation. Regionally the nodes will be networked together through a regional headquarters hub and globally through a higher headquarters. There would consist of two types of headquarter hubs or supporting arms. The first headquarters hub would provide command, control, and support to the nodes within a region. This regional headquarters hub would act as a bridge between nodes within the region and to other nodes within other regional areas. The second level of headquarters hub would be overall responsible for the DoD prioritization and implementation of this strategy and would act as a bridge for different regional nodes. This would allow for direct coordination and fusion of information and intelligence.

This strategy applies Gordon McCormick's Mystic Diamond framework to attack the enemy. The Mystic Diamond can be employed at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. The terror/insurgent threat is the counter state. The U.S. will be able to simultaneously attack the counter state through all available Mystic Diamond operational strategies. Strategically the U.S. will use operational strategies 3, 4, and 5. It will attack the terror/insurgents directly either with the UW force or the DE force. Militarily it will attack the terror/insurgent's international support by attacking the safe havens and conducting regime change with the UW force or DE force. Additionally the U.S. will extend infrastructure internationally by bolstering friendly nation states with the FID force.

Operationally the FID force will be attempting to extend the infrastructure of a friendly nation state to counter the terror/insurgent support base within their countries. Additionally the FID force in conjunction with host nation state forces will operate indirectly to undermine the terror/insurgent threat's legitimacy. As targets of opportunity present itself the DE force in conjunction with the host nation can attack the terrorist/insurgents directly.

Operationally when employed the UW force will use operational strategies 1 and 2. The UW force can be used to attack the enemy directly or call for the DE force to come in and attack the enemy.

The following sections will discuss each concept in detail.

## 1. Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

An enhanced Foreign Internal Defense (FID) concept, applied as the primary tool of U.S. national policy, will serve as an effective deterrent solution to the global insurgent threat. This section justifies such by analyzing the conduct of the United States through the framework of its own doctrine and the State/Counter-state dynamic as presented by Gordon McCormick.<sup>157</sup> It further elucidates the concept with a case study of FID and its application. Today's world stage requires the U.S. to adopt a more indirect role in fighting the GWOT. Part of the United States DoD strategy must revolve around the mitigation of insurgency. As we have contested, different countries and regions of the world foster conditions, either through mismanaged governance or natural occurrence, that leaves a segment of their population ripe for insurgency. It is this local problem that the U.S. must address before it reaches global proportions and effectiveness.

Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)* defines FID as:

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.<sup>158</sup>

As the definition states FID is more than just the military. All elements of national power need to be applied to adequately support FID. "The focus of all US foreign internal defense (FID) efforts is to support the host nation's (HN's) program of internal defense and development (IDAD)."<sup>159</sup>

In order to understand FID more clearly, the following sections will outline: a) the necessary conditions under which it can be applied; b) the need to create a "tipping point"; c) how FID can be applied en-lieu of offensive engagement; d) an analysis of FID conducted in El Salvador and the Philippines; and e) conclusion.

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<sup>157</sup> Gordon McCormick, *Intro to Guerrilla Warfare*, (Class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006).

<sup>158</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, (Washington DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 April 2004), GL-7.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., I-1. JP 3-07.1 defines IDAD "The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society." (GL-7-GL-8).

*a. Conditions for Application*

“Management of the FID effort begins at the national level, with the selection of those nations the US will support through FID programs. This decision is made by the President with advice from the secretary of state, Secretary of Defense, and other officials.”<sup>160</sup> With that in mind decision makers should target FID programs toward nations that can assist in the GWOT. Joint policy currently dictates three conditions that must be met for the U.S. to utilize FID as a means of interaction. First, the country or region in question must ask for assistance; secondly, that country must have the internal capability to utilize U.S. assistance; and lastly, support to such a nation or region would be the United States’ best interest.<sup>161</sup>

Once the decision has been made to implement a FID program military decision makers must determine what kind of support is needed.

Indirect Support. These operations emphasize the principle of HN self-sufficiency. Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The US military contribution to this type of support is derived from security cooperation guidance and provided primarily through SA, supplemented by multinational exercises, exchange programs, and selected joint exercises.<sup>162</sup>

Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations)...these operations involve the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. They differ from SA in that they are joint- or Service-funded, do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually but may include training local military forces. Direct support operations are normally conducted when the HN has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle. Assistance will normally focus on CMO (primarily, the provision of services to the local populace), PSYOP, communications and intelligence sharing, and logistic support. In some cases, training of the military and the provision of new equipment may be warranted.<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> JP 3-07.1, xi.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., I-5-I-6.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., I-11.



US Combat Operations. The introduction of US combat forces into FID operations requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace. In all cases, US combat operations support the HN IDAD program and remain strategically defensive in nature. While joint and Service doctrine provides specific tactical procedures, there are certain principles that should guide employment of US forces in a tactical role in support of a FID program. These principles, and the specific command and control (C2) and employment considerations for joint and multinational tactical operations in FID, serve as the focus for discussions of tactical operations in this publication.<sup>164</sup>

When conducting combat operations the U.S. military must follow the principles laid on in JP3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)* to ensure that host nation legitimacy is maintained.<sup>165</sup>

***b. Creating a “Tipping Point”: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and FID***

As defined by US Army doctrine, insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”<sup>166</sup> The current enemy falls under the definition of an insurgency with a common anti-western/anti-U.S. ideology and shared tactics on a global scale. Apart from relying on conventional methods of retaliation or preemptive strike, such operations against the U.S. call for a different engagement approach in order to either deter would be insurgents, or deny attack.

Using an analogous “Tipping Point”<sup>167</sup> metaphor, the United States, through solidly applied FID concepts, stabilizes other nations whose balance of influence over their population is threatened by insurgency, lawlessness, and subversion. By adding “weight,” through the assistance of the U.S. with that nation’s elements of national power, legitimacy of the government is able gain control of the population away from those insurgent entities wrestling for the same influence.

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<sup>164</sup> JP 3-07.1, I-13-I-14.

<sup>165</sup> For more detailed information see JP 3-07.1 page I-14.

<sup>166</sup> United States Army, *FM 31-20-3: Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces* (Washington, DC: USAPA, 1994), 1-6.

<sup>167</sup> The concept of a “tipping point” is most currently embellished in pop-psychology by Malcolm Gladwell, *Tipping Point* (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2002), 9.




Figure 4. FID Tipping Point

FID advisors need to establish measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to gauge the effectiveness of the host nation's IDAD strategy and to determine if the host nation is approaching the "tipping point." JP 3-07.1 states "MOEs should focus on long-term, attainable objectives rather than short-term targets, limited objectives, or over-ambitious development goals."<sup>168</sup> When determining MOEs, advisors must be cognizant that the MOEs can be misleading i.e., a high body count of guerrillas does not necessarily mean the insurgency is on the decline.

**c. *Offensive Engagement En-lieu of Conventional Attack: Counter-Guerrilla Tactics v Counterinsurgent Strategy***

The United States Counterinsurgent (COIN) strategy stems from an overarching Foreign Internal Defense (FID) concept. The United States, in cooperation with various nations prone to insurgency, and in its own national interest, seeks to deter such terrorist expansion by helping those nations protect themselves.<sup>169</sup> COIN is a strategic

<sup>168</sup> JP 3-07.1, III-10.

<sup>169</sup> United States Army, *FM 31-05.20: Special Forces Operations*. (Washington, DC: USAPA, 2001).

mechanism of this model. The United States Military, specifically the Army Special Forces', operational efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq revolve around this concept of fixing the insurgent problem at the root cause -- the population -- by developing security, and the indigenous infrastructure of such, and building upon an environment increasingly intolerant to insurgent activity. Typical operations in both theaters, down to the smallest tactical level since 2001, have involved the embedding of U.S. assets into the local infrastructure to develop civic and military capabilities.<sup>170</sup> These counterinsurgent strategic and operational successes amongst the population have bred numerous tactical, counter-guerrilla hits. Highlighted tactical success, unfortunately, has produced an ancillary influencing effect of a more tangible "body-count" that directors of Special Operations Forces and the conventional generals have latched on to.

A major factor is a growing perception among special operators that in the Pentagon and, increasingly, US Special Operations Command, senior leaders are only interested in missions and units that emphasize one set of special ops skills – namely, the man-hunting and direct action, known colloquially as "door-kicking".<sup>171</sup>

The irregular forces' of the Department of Defense, and the State Department's inability to represent to the administration their true *raison d'etre* in the conduct of strategic FID and COIN, and successes on a limited scale therefore reduces DoD's strategic effectiveness in the GWOT and limits the military to the reactive kinetic action role as envisioned by Special Operations Command and the conventional military. Tactically, the U.S. succeeds at killing terrorists. But, this is not the statistic that counts towards the defeat of the global insurgents as a whole.

These mostly kinetic, "kill or capture" operations conducted by the military in both theaters, belie one of the United States' truly effective capabilities: that is, its ability to shape the globe with U.S. national interests in mind, with non-kinetic methods of operation and headed by non-conventional soldier/statesmen. Far from being the nation's catch-all deterrent solution, this capability, in effect, carries ample credibility

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<sup>170</sup> CDR, 3/3, comments on the use of Special Forces during a briefing to NPS students 8 May 2006.

<sup>171</sup> Sean D. Naylor, "More Than Door-Kickers: Special Ops Forces Are Misused as Man-Hunters, Critics Say," *Armed Forces Journal*, (March 2006): 28.

and stability to stand as an effective deterrent tactic for the United States.<sup>172</sup> Apart from the two Middle Eastern theaters, DoD, with the use of Special Forces, lead in COIN efforts around the globe especially in Islamic insurgency prone areas of South and Southeast Asia. Implementation of the Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) concept, in conjunction with and outlined by the State Department, fosters other countries' ability to defend itself and further help protect the U.S. and its interests. It is in these areas where the non-kinetic executions of COIN strategy, outside of the scrutiny of higher command (such as in the Middle East), shines and has proven successful. Continuing efforts within the Indonesian-Philippine Archipelago, though tactically and rightfully constrained due to Host Nation law, have proven extremely fruitful, not by the use of the U.S. Military as "door kickers," but as a Host Nation's combat multiplier in the FID/COIN role defined by doctrine, and employed according to the principles of influencing the population as the center of gravity. The expulsion of Abu-Sayyaff out of Basilan Island, and the continued degradation of their influence, proves the success of non-conventional, non-kinetic applications.<sup>173</sup> Again, however, such indirect success escapes the highlight of the Command or the Secretary of Defense, en-lieu of numbers producing kinetic operations.

In such a conflict, control of the population, that is, influence attained by the state or the insurgents over the population, stands as the center of gravity. Assuming that a nation has accepted the cooperation of the U.S., the incumbent authority must first provide security to its populace.<sup>174</sup> This includes actions from basic law enforcement to emergency population control measures. The state must provide a unified civil/military force to first protect the populace and threaten the insurgents' survival within the community, and second, convince individuals not to side with the insurgents by showing the state as responsive and competent.<sup>175</sup> Tactical measures include food rationing, identification, roadblocks, checkpoints, and curfews. These procedures, when employed judiciously, segregate the insurgents from their support base either physically or

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<sup>172</sup> P.K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 4.

<sup>173</sup> Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare*, Volume. 18, Issue 2, (September 2005): 2.

<sup>174</sup> FM 31-20-3.

<sup>175</sup> McCormick.

psychologically, reducing the insurgents to the level of criminals. Such measures, however, must be weighed proportionally to what the society can tolerate. This deterrent action must be stable, in that such action will not escalate the situation or prompt blowback.<sup>176</sup>

The Department of Defense, in conjunction with the efforts of the State Department, has the capacity with SF to strategically implement such cooperation, but does not focus or apply such towards this delicate mission. Instead, the lead of U.S. military efforts in the GWOT, while figuratively given to non-conventional units, is retained by conventional and hyper-conventional forces with a direct action mindset. Violent and heavy handed counter-guerrilla action, executed by a conventional force, typically negates the strides gained by non-kinetic civil-military operations. The limited tactical success, loved so much by a tangible-results-oriented army, and fueled by impatient public, breeds only a desire for more of that capability.

**d. *The Mystic Diamond and Successful Cases of Application***

(1) FID Historical Analysis: El Salvador. When we look at using an expanded Foreign Internal Defense program to meet the goal of defeating global terrorism, we need to have an idea if it is going to work. The best way of evaluating if FID can work is to look to history and find a case study where it helped to defeat an insurgency. U.S. involvement in El Salvador provides a possible example.

In El Salvador from 1980 until 1992, a small group of American military advisors helped to defeat a committed insurgency. Limited by congress to a cap of only 55 training personnel, the American FID mission helped to shape the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) into a credible force.<sup>177</sup>

When the American mission began, the ESAF was a force of only 9,000 incapable of flexible maneuver, largely tied to static defense missions, and vulnerable to defeat by the rebels.<sup>178</sup> The combination of U.S. military aide and this small advisory team allowed the ESAF to grow to a force of over 40,000. The improved

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<sup>176</sup> Robert O'Connell, *Deterrence, Coercion and Crisis Management*, (Class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, Winter 2006).

<sup>177</sup> Bailey, 18.

<sup>178</sup> Bailey, 19.

capability of the ESAF first convinced the guerillas that they (1) could not defeat the ESAF (2) faced possible defeat by the ESAF (3) needed to accept negotiations.<sup>179</sup>

Analyzing El Salvador as a case study on FID, two major points must be made. First, the combination of American advisors and military aide proved particularly effective. Advisors were able to ensure that military aide was correctly used and the importance of that aide put great pressure on the ESAF to listen to the advisors.<sup>180</sup> Second, the advisors were credited by several reports, including a United Nations report with improving the combat effectiveness, human rights performance, constitutional respect, and democratic values in El Salvadoran Armed Forces.<sup>181</sup>

El Salvador provides an example of how a small group of advisors on a FID mission can help to change the course of an insurgency. An individual, regional specific assessment of that country's situation illuminated the requirement for military assistance against a growing insurgent threat. We can see by way of comparison that the El Salvador's governance, with assistance from the United States correctly identified the operational strategy (reference McCormick's Diamond Model) to employ. Providing a baseline of nation security as a priority, and then attritting the insurgent after having removed the support or ambivalence of the population, the emboldened military force defeated the threat. For the U.S., specifically at this time when President Reagan re-engaged the Cold War with increased spending and clandestine operations via irregular forces, El Salvador marked a containment success against communist expansion. By keeping a low profile, this mission was sustainable over the long term and ultimately successful.

(2) FID Historical Analysis: Basilan Island. The United States and Philippine COIN operations of 2003, labeled BALIKATAN, stand as what has become the model of the Mystic Diamond in application...to the point of being coined the "Basilan Model."<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> Bailey, 26.

<sup>180</sup> Sepp, Kalev, *Seminar on the History of Special Operations*, (Class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, May 2006). Professor Sepp was a SF Advisor in El Salvador.

<sup>181</sup> Bailey, 26.

<sup>182</sup> Gregory Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF- Philippines and The Indirect Approach," *Military Review* (November – December 2006): 4.

The attacks of 9/11 prompted the U.S. to extend action to wherever al Qaeda was to be linked or found. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Jemaaah Islamiyya (all AQ linked) found operational and supportive refuge in the southern Philippines, and at the same time were holding U.S. citizens hostage, putting the region in the crosshairs of US response to “terrorism.”<sup>183</sup>

In conjunction with the State Department and the Philippine government, the DoD planned a joint COIN campaign to be executed as part of FID assistance to the region. In this case, it was determined that security need be reinstated and focused on the development of the ASG island stronghold on Basilan.<sup>184</sup> Specific requirements to the needs of the population were further determined by United States Special Forces advisors to the region in order to refine a phased strategy of employment.

The team[s] conducted detailed area assessments down to the village level and updated them throughout the operation. They gathered vital information about the enemy situation, army training requirements, local demographics, infrastructure, and socioeconomic conditions.<sup>185</sup>

The enhanced capabilities of Special Forces’ efforts added to an in-depth understanding of the situation and tempered military employment to effective ends. Specifically, COL Gregory Wilson, then one of the advisors and planners, further elucidates the principles of the Diamond Model as applied to Basilan, to pursue three operational strategies:

- *Building Philippine Armed Forces* capacity in order to create security on the island.
- *Focused civil-military operations* to improve the quality of life for the citizens.
- *Information Operations* aiming to enhance governmental legitimacy.<sup>186</sup>
- Again, the center of gravity for operations against the insurgents flows indirectly through the engagement of the population. By securing the population and setting the conditions to establish a responsive, legitimate

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<sup>183</sup> Wilson, 4.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>185</sup> LTC Eric Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” *Special Warfare Magazine* (September 2005) quoted in Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF- Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” *Military Review* (November – December 2006): 6.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

governmental presence, this FID operation all but eliminated the ASG presence in the region.

Further reflection of both planners and operators within the American and Philippine forces note the success of this ongoing effort. One Philippine officer reported,

Where once the people supported rebels and extremists because they felt neglected or oppressed by the government, the delivery of their basic needs ... construction of infrastructure... and strengthening security in the community that the Balikatan program brought [sic] changed their attitudes and loyalty. As residents began to experience better living conditions, they withdrew support from the militants.<sup>187</sup>

This is successful FID in action. With the application of the “Mystic Diamond” Model to the specific situation as identified by properly trained and educated soldier/diplomats, the legitimate host nation forces quelled an ongoing and rising insurgent problem in their own backyard, while at the same time, the United States reduced the global insurgent problem by emphasizing and confronting a local insurgency with ties to U.S. national security interests. The correct focus of application, in this case, almost stems as a result of a lack of higher oversight (focused on the “Main Effort” in Afghanistan) and scrutinization from a disinterested public. It can be theorized that the minimal footprint of the SOF forces, and public attention on the Middle East and South Asia freed the strategists and operators to temper operations to the recognized problem set...a local insurgency to be defeated not by overt U.S. direct action, but a skilful, holistic application of indirect COIN methods inspired by the Mystic Diamond Model.

*e. Conclusion: US Involvement and Legitimacy*

Foreign Internal Defense can act as a great force multiplier. Faced with a limited budget and limited forces and a truly global war, a conventional execution is not the answer. Developing and using an expanded FID capability will allow the U.S. to maintain the long-term, low intensity involvement that is needed to prevail in the GWOT.

Far from acting as the world’s SWAT team, the U.S. Military, in cooperation with the Host Nation’s civil and military forces and the State Department,

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<sup>187</sup> COL Darwin Z. Guerra, “Peace-Building in Basilan: The Army’s 103<sup>rd</sup> Brigade Soldier’s Final Battle,” unpublished, 1 quoted in Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” *Military Review* (November – December 2006): 8.



has denied the insurgents freedom of maneuver within a limited global population, as evident from *operational* success in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines.<sup>188</sup> The United States Special Forces works to bolster a nation's capabilities to act unilaterally in safeguarding itself from lawlessness, subversion and further insurgency. The transition of authority and capability from the U.S. to the now developed and competent Host Nation deters the insurgent from rallying the so called oppressed against a supposedly incompetent regime. This indirect approach denies the insurgent freedom of maneuver and threatens his existence.

Such non-kinetic acts for control of the population, implemented by an IDAD concept, also enable a host nation government's engagement strategy to actively confront the insurgents.<sup>189</sup> Trusted by the population, the state works its own intelligence collection apparatus into the insurgent infrastructure attempting to operate amongst the people. By the development of local paramilitary or security organizations, the state puts the responsibility of livelihood on the shoulders of the local community. That community, united in its own self-interest, rejects insurgent incursions by policing their own, or providing actionable intelligence to the state forces. The state forces are then able to directly apply kinetic action against the insurgents. As the insurgents' capabilities dwindle from inactivity or attrition, or the insurgents themselves realize the futility of their actions, incentive programs, such as amnesty, bring once or would be insurgents back to society.

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<sup>188</sup> Supported by the author's personal observations in South and South East Asia, and corroborated from second hand accounts from subordinates and peers.

<sup>189</sup> **The 5 Principles of IDAD:** Unity of Effort, Maximum use of Intelligence, Minimum Use of Violence, A Responsive Government, Maximum use of Information (Psychological operations and Civil Affairs). **The 4 Functions of IDAD:** Balanced Development, Security, Mobilization, Neutralization. These principles and functions make up the framework for any U.S. strategy with regards to Foreign Internal Defense (FID) to include counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies. JP 3-07.1 II-16, B-1.

## The Relationship of Counter-Guerilla Operations to a Counter-Insurgent Strategy to DoD Strategy




Figure 5. Relational Pyramid (From: *Special Warfare*)<sup>190</sup>

United States FID/COIN strategy is therefore a multi-operational approach to deterring and defeating insurgency.<sup>191</sup> Applied specifically to a single nation and their difficulties in self-preservation, or broadly against a Global Insurgent, the concept of deterring the insurgent by denying them the population with an application of the IDAD (bolstering that nation's diplomatic, informational, military and economic capabilities,) and destroying the insurgent infrastructure both directly and indirectly, stands as a credible and stable alternative to conventional, reactive confrontation.

### 2. Unconventional Warfare (UW)

This section will present an alternative solution to coerce a nation state that supports or fomenters terrorism. Rather than simply relying on a conventional invasion and subsequent occupation using all the might and power of the United States military, this primary offensive method will be through the application of U.S. sponsored UW.

<sup>190</sup> Mark Grdovic, "Understanding Counterinsurgency," *Special Warfare*, Volume 17, Issue 2, (December 2004): 5.

<sup>191</sup> McCormick.

Robert F. Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva recognize that what they call international terrorism can be deterred, both specifically with punishment over terrorist acts and by denying the terrorists freedom to attack or maneuver.<sup>192</sup> Yes, this threat can be effectively deterred with what is already in the United States' arsenal, but only after positively defining the nature of the entire threat and recognizing the inherent capabilities within the U.S. government. Even a cursory analysis of the threat would justly steer the use of military power in the direction of non-conventional or irregular means of interdiction. Our thesis has argued part of the solution to be a preemptory engagement strategy led by a strong commitment to FID. This is but one third, albeit the emphasized portion of the strategic equation. The second emphasis of this proactive/reactive combination strategy is the offensive component aligned under deterrence through punishment. Still being primarily irregular, the United States can effectively employ or set the conditions for punitive regime change in support of National Security objectives with the use of units specifically geared for UW.

Unfortunately, UW is a misunderstood term with varying definitions. The definition of UW has gone through many metamorphoses through the ages. Currently Joint Publication 1-02 and Joint Publication 3-05 define UW as:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.<sup>193</sup>

FM 1-02 and FM 3-05.201 *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, definition is similar, but differs in “conducted through, with, or by indigenous” versus “conducted by indigenous.” The second sentence also differs, the joint publication allows for a broader interpretation of what activities fall under UW. FM 3-05.201 defines UW as:

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<sup>192</sup> Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done.” *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3, (Winter 2005/06), 87-123.

<sup>193</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 560.

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape.<sup>194</sup>

Though recently contested in definition, these UW operations are best summarized and described by LTC Mark Grdovic as:

...activities conducted by the US government to support insurgencies conducting operations to disrupt or defeat a hostile government or occupying power in accordance with US strategic goals.<sup>195</sup>

This is further elucidated by the most recent Army manual stating:

The intent of US Unconventional Warfare operations is to exploit a hostile power's political, military, economic and psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US strategic goals.<sup>196</sup>

Unconventional Warfare addresses the concerns of policy makers and their need for action, but keeps the U.S. signature of such action at a minimum for the longest time possible resulting in sound international strategy, offering domestic political benefits by limiting U.S. force deployment, and providing tactical advantage for the introduction of more kinetic means of application.

Decision makers must also, however, realize that just as the Joint Publication states, UW is of long duration. Quick results are more than likely not going to be forthcoming, and decision makers should be committed to the prolonged engagement. The United States' recent successes in UW have bred a misunderstanding of utilization. The Department of Defense and the Department of State have recognized the utility of this operational strategy, but are currently hampered by the quickly gratifying results of optimal U.S. sponsored insurgent conditions such as the case of UW efforts in Operation

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<sup>194</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations* (Washington DC: GPO, April 2003) Glossary-11.

<sup>195</sup> Mark Grdovic, "Understanding Unconventional Warfare and U.S. Army Special Forces," *Special Warfare Volume 19 Issue 5 (September-October 2006)*, 20.

<sup>196</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, 1-1.

Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).<sup>197</sup> Such operations of this sort additionally belie other strategic uses of UW other than simply preparing for conventional invasion. In essence, the U.S. has been and continues to be limited by its very recent successes.

In order to understand UW more clearly, the following sections will outline: a) the necessary conditions under which it can be applied; b) the need to create a "tipping point"; c) how UW can be applied en-lieu of conventional attack; d) an analysis of UW conducted in World War II; and e) conclusion.

*a. Conditions for Application*

U.S. sponsored Unconventional Warfare addresses specifically the relationship of state-sponsored terrorism against the United States and DoD reaction to such. -Not all situations may present obvious non-kinetic options, but all will be similar in that all nations or regional non-state power structures operate through the employment of elements of national power. Fractures between the enemy government and its population can be exploited. Considering the nature of support to any particular regime, and the fractures identified within the enemy national infrastructure, UW targets the will of that population, not to be eroded as in most historical cases, but bolstered in opposition to a government exporting terror in their name.<sup>198</sup> By either setting the conditions for a more forceful regime change with conventional forces and campaigns, or enhancing the chances of change from within, the sponsorship of insurgency gives the U.S. a valid, legitimate option for punitive action.

There are two main conditions that must be met prior to implementing a UW campaign. First and foremost the nation state must pose a threat to the United States by supporting and fomenting terrorism. As previously identified, such state support can be either officially sanctioned by that country's national government i.e., Iran, or unofficially sanctioned by the ruling powers of that population i.e., a competing governance, Saudi Arabia. The second condition that must be present is there has to be

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<sup>197</sup> Grdovic, 19.

<sup>198</sup> McCormick.

some type of internal resistance or opposition for U.S. forces to work with. “Before the conduct of SF UW operations, a resistance potential should exist. SF personnel do not create this resistance potential”.<sup>199</sup>

The first condition may seem pretty clear cut, but prior to ordering the initiation of a UW campaign, decision makers must ensure that it is in America’s best interest to attack that country at the present time. Conducting regime change might have second and third order effects that will create a bigger problem. Instead, decision makers might want to look at containing the offending nation state through the manipulation of other elements of national power.

Once decision makers have determined how they are going to apply UW, they must determine the U.S. commitment level. The U.S. can look at three levels of commitment to UW. Derek Jones, in discussions with Mark Grdovic, proposes adding to the definition of UW by adding three types of support which would correlate to the level of commitment: indirect support, direct support, and direct support involving combat operations.<sup>200</sup>

- **Indirect support**-provide logistical support to insurgent forces. This indirect support could be through directly providing arms, ammunition, and equipment or selling the above mentioned items to insurgent forces. This type of support can also include political and morale support to the insurgent forces.
- **Direct support**-provide logistical support, training, and intelligence support to insurgent forces as well as U.S. advisors.
- **Direct support involving combat operations**-this would involve the insertion of USSF to conduct operations by, with, and through insurgents against the hostile central government. This support would also include U.S. aircraft to provide close air support as needed.

In addition to ensuring the appropriate conditions are set for U.S. sponsored UW, decision makers and leaders must ensure that the principles of UW, as put forth by Steven P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons in *Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare*, are followed. The principles are as follows:

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<sup>199</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, 1-3.

<sup>200</sup> D. Jones, “Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and Why Words Matter,” *Special Warfare Volume 19 Issue 4 (August 2006)*, 20-27, ProQuest [Website]; available from <http://proquest.umi.com>; Internet; accessed 3 May 2007.

- **The Principle of Overlapping Objectives**—US Military objectives must overlap with the indigenous force’s political objectives. If military and political objectives are incongruent, there will be extreme difficulties in achieving the military objectives the US is seeking to accomplish.
- **The Principle of Decontrol**—This principle preempts UW efforts from becoming “bureaucratically compromised.” Effective decision-making must be predicated on local conditions. Secondly, UW operators working with indigenous forces must be able to make snap decisions when required. Excessive command and control is a hindrance on UW operations.
- **The Principle of Restraint**—UW operations are characterized by the discreet application of firepower. This may imply greater individual risk on the part of the UW operators but the benefits far outweigh the costs.
- **The Principle of Perseverance**—This principle is best understood in the context that UW operations take time to develop.
- **The Principle of Fostering Legitimacy**—Perhaps the most important principle. UW operations with legitimacy have a better chance for long-term success. Legitimacy can be built over time but sacrificing legitimacy for expediency should not be done without careful consideration.<sup>201</sup>

*b. Creating a “Tipping Point”*

In creating the “tipping point” U.S. forces in conjunction with the insurgent forces are attempting to sway the influence of the host nation population. Charles Burton Marshall states, “Battle is only one aspect of the competition between government and challenger” and “The affection or disaffection of the local society thus is a decisive factor in the outcome of the armed aspects of the struggle”.<sup>202</sup> The legitimacy of the government must be decreased while the insurgency’s legitimacy must be increased. The support of the populace is critical for the toppling of regime.

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<sup>201</sup> Steven P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons, “Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2004), 61.

<sup>202</sup> Charles Burton Marshall, “Unconventional Warfare as a Concern of American Foreign Policy,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 341, Unconventional Warfare, (May, 1962): 93-101, JSTOR [electronic database]; available from <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7162%28196205%29341%3C93%3AUWAACO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W>; Internet, accessed 4 May 2007, 98.




Figure 6. UW Tipping Point

The UW campaign commander must have some way to measure the effectiveness of the UW campaign; the commander needs to know when he is approaching the “tipping point”. Steven P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons offer seven tactical [operational] and two strategic measures of effectiveness that a commander can use.

#### **Tactical [Operational]**

- Desertion rates.
- Morale.
- Recruiting.
- Number of guerrilla/terrorist incidents.
- Counter-guerrilla reporting from the population.
- Increased indiscriminate government violence.
- Redeployment of military/police assets.

#### **Strategic**

- Increased international recognition of insurgents.



- Decrease international support for government.<sup>203</sup>

With appropriate measures of effectiveness commanders at the various levels can modify tactics to achieve the “tipping point”.

*c. Offensive Engagement En-lieu of Conventional Attack*

A conventional attack requires a large footprint of U.S. forces and equipment. This footprint has a large impact on not only the national population, but also the global population. The invasion of Iraq required a disproportionately larger number of troops and their equipment to topple Saddam Hussein. The invasion of Afghanistan was accomplished with a handful of SF A-teams working in conjunction with Anti-Taliban forces, and U.S. close air support that toppled the Taliban government. A smaller offensive footprint is more palatable for the U.S. public to swallow.

US sponsored insurgency, or the execution of UW, has to maintain legitimacy in the conduct of its actions. The “means must justify the ends” in this case. As such SF, working in conjunction with the insurgents against an enemy regime, must concentrate on legitimate targets. Having the backing of the U.S., through all levels of support, negates the need to resort to a tactic of a weak position... terrorism. In as much, a low U.S. signature, coupled with a successful, legitimate new government (born of the guerrilla battlefield) fosters effective leadership to the population and represents validity to the international communities... not to mention adding a new friend to the list of U.S. Allies. While not all situations may be suitable for the sole use of UW as a means of interdiction, most instances will present opportunities for exploitation by indirect means. Just as COIN operations would primarily target control of the population away from the insurgent, so too would the opposite be true with UW. The U.S. sponsored insurgents would wrestle control of the population away from the government by employing all levels of tactical operations short of terrorism to gain this support. These operations include aggressive propaganda, guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage.

U.S. sponsored UW can be applied two ways. First, the U.S. can provide support to the revolutionary/opposition force. Secondly, the U.S. can commit U.S. forces

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<sup>203</sup> Basilici and Simmons, 37-38.

to support the resistance/opposition force with the intent of establishing conditions for the introduction of conventional forces.<sup>204</sup>

The distinction between the two will affect not only the amount of risk U.S. UW forces will take, but also the targets attacked. In the first case of application, resistance forces can target any infrastructure that will harass, interdict, or delegitimize the enemy government, short of specifically targeting civilians for the purpose of coercion through terror...that is “terrorism.” In the second case some targets (such as certain infrastructure) might not be targeted because the destruction would harm the livelihood of the population, or otherwise hinder the advancement of conventional forces.

By specifically identifying elements of national power that are most susceptible to attack, the U.S. sponsored insurgents can set the conditions for revolution by judiciously employing appropriate levels of support. Not all insurgencies would subsequently require an SF led guerrilla force to do the job. Just as in FID, certain levels of support would enhance the overall perception and acceptance of either the irregular fighting force preparing for allied invasion, or the new government in place after the overthrow of the oppressors.

*d. The Mystic Diamond and Successful Case of Application*

Examples of DoD, that is the U.S. Army run, Unconventional Warfare operations are few and far between, and relatively unseen in the larger context of military history. In and of itself, this facet strengthens the argument for employment. In most cases UW was primarily used to set the conditions for an eventual invasion of conventional forces. Recent hallmark operations of Afghanistan OEF 2001 and Northern Iraq in the beginning phases of OIF in 2003, have re-established the standard of U.S. Army UW application.

But, perhaps the best example of effective operational and strategic UW is the ground breaking structure and efforts of the clandestine U.S. and British units of World War II, specifically in the European theater, representing the helicon days of special operations when the Office of Strategic Services had not yet split into the CIA and modern U.S. Special Forces. Not simply operational in nature, the UW efforts prior

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<sup>204</sup> Grdovic, 20.

to D-Day not only helped to establish favorable conditions for the following landing forces, but also strategically helped strengthen the resolve and capabilities of a nation under occupation. In this case of offensive indirect action, the primary operational strategy to effect the degradation and eventual defeat of the state in this case is first OS 1 targeting primarily the will and support of the population, and then OS 2, attacking the German's methods of control over the French (through their military occupation forces.) Does this example stretch back to the inception of U.S. Unconventional Warfare? Yes. Is this a dated example? No. This unit and situation perfectly exemplified DoD's inherent capability that it at one time wielded with ingenuity and effectiveness. Some may even argue for a return to this structure and capability. A brief review of this lends understanding of where the United States needs to go in terms of support to insurgency to carry out strategic objectives.

While Germany occupied most of the European continent, the staff of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces) planned a cross-channel invasion into France to alleviate their Russian ally, and set-off the demise of the Third Reich. To divert enemy forces, cause confusion, and generally thwart the Germans' response to the attack, the command of Special Forces Headquarters decided to insert operational groups to train and organize the French resistance, who waged a guerilla war since 1940. The Jedburghs was one such group inserted deep into enemy territory to complete this dangerous mission.

This unit stands as one of the most successful special operations groups to be used in World War II. Their accomplishments struck the occupying Germans' interior lines, and raised the spirits of those oppressed. The Jedburghs represented a contact for the partisans and the allied forces that would soon liberate them.

Recruits were selected from all branches of service in a call for those volunteering for hazardous duty. SFHQ decided that both the OSS and SOE would field

a total of 100, three-man teams.<sup>205</sup> Each team would optimally consist of one Frenchman, one Englishman, and an American (with a few Belgians included); two officers and one sergeant radio operator.<sup>206</sup>

Because of this unique task, men were sought who had certain qualities enhancing their ability to cope with the strenuous and dangerous nature of the mission. Those recruited were "picked for qualities of leadership and daring, [the] ability to speak French, and all around physical condition." Plus, they had to "have the ability to parachute behind enemy lines. . . be experienced in handling men. . . and have an aptitude for small arms." By the beginning of February 1943, more than 300 potential commandos answered the call.<sup>207</sup>

The training center for the newly created group was an old Elizabethan mansion, called Milton Hall, at Jedburgh in northeast England; hence the operational codename -- JEDBURGH. Those commandos involved became known as Jedburghs or Jeds.<sup>208</sup> Established by Lieutenant Colonel Frank V. Spooner of the British Army (SOE), the Jeds trained in all forms of commando-type operations and in the skills needed for their specific mission. These skills included "demolitions, foreign weapons training, [day and] night navigation, agent circuit operations, intelligence, sabotage, escape and evasion, counterespionage, ambushes, security, the use of couriers [and dead drops], and hand-to-hand combat."<sup>209</sup> In addition, they had to be proficient in French, the use of Morse code, and operate the "suitcase" British B Mark II radio specially designed for them.<sup>210</sup>

The Americans, before coming to Milton Hall, had to undergo psychological examinations, study SOE communications, practice marksmanship and

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<sup>205</sup> S.J. Lewis, *Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1991), 4.

<sup>206</sup> Philip Warner, *Secret Forces of World War II* (Chelsea, Michigan: Scarborough House/Publishers, 1991), 188.

<sup>207</sup> S.J. Lewis, *Jedburgh Team Operations*, 7-8, cited from OSS/London SO microfilm, roll 3, frames 648-51.

<sup>208</sup> Russell Miller, *The Commandos* (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1981), 153.

<sup>209</sup> Lewis, *Jedburgh Team Operations*, 11.

<sup>210</sup> James D. Ladd, Keith Melton, and CPT Peter Mason, *Clandestine Warfare: Weapons and Equipment of the SOE and OSS* (New York: Blandford Press, 1988), 94.

self-defense, and attend the British Ringway (three-day) Jump school where they learned to exit RAF bombers from "Joe-holes."<sup>211</sup> This additional training and education was intended to bring the U.S. servicemen up to the SAS commando standards before launching into Jedburgh. By the end of their Milton Hall stay, Major William Colby (a Jedburgh himself and future director of the U.S. CIA) stated that these soldiers "were honed to the sharpest edge humanly possible."<sup>212</sup>

By May, 1944, the Jeds were fully prepared to deploy. In that same month, the initial teams were sent to North Africa, later to parachute into southern France.<sup>213</sup> The rest were inserted over the duration of the summer to total 93 teams in country by September with seven teams in Holland.<sup>214</sup> Amazingly, the Jeds suffered only 21 casualties, all but two (initial parachute injuries) incurred in action. No one was ever captured.<sup>215</sup>

As a rule, the Jeds wore uniforms of their nationality and prepared no cover story to avoid being shot as spies. The uniform also augmented their authority and gave the Maquis a sense of working directly in conjunction with the allied forces.<sup>216</sup> If captured, they gave name, rank, and serial number, claiming the provisions due to them according to military law.<sup>217</sup> Their mission was not to infiltrate the Germans themselves, but to organize resistance in response to the impending invasion. With this in mind, the efficiency of this elite unit can be analyzed by noting their success during Operation Overlord and the subsequent breakout. The Jeds did not assume command functions within the Maquis; they simply helped plan and conduct sabotage operations on communication installations, fuel and ammunition depots, and attack enemy pockets of resistance cut off by the advancing Allies.<sup>218</sup> At the same time, the Jeds were to provide

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<sup>211</sup> Lewis, *Jedburgh Team Operations*, 11.

<sup>212</sup> Miller, *The Commandos*, 154.

<sup>213</sup> Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 234.

<sup>214</sup> United States War Department, *Strategic Services Unit, History Project: The War Report of the OSS, with a new introduction by Kermit Roosevelt*, vol. 2, (New York: Walker and Co., 1976), 199.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Miller, *The Commandos*, 153.

<sup>217</sup> U.S. War Dept., *The War Report*, 199

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

intelligence and an immediate link from local units to SHAEF's headquarters.<sup>219</sup> This communications link especially helped SHAEF to best utilize the Maquis. Once overrun by the allies, the remaining Jeds would assume a liaison's role by coordinating with locals to reestablish the civil administration out of German occupation and arrange partisan assistance in guarding important installations.<sup>220</sup>

The Jedburghs, in total, armed and organized over 20,000 guerillas. These forces managed to cut important railways, immobilize trains, and destroy engines, thus effectively slowing rail traffic on the Cherbourg Peninsula.<sup>221</sup> "As a consequence of this Maquis activity, a major part of the German forces in Brittany was diverted to fighting resistance groups."<sup>222</sup> Included also in this sabotage was the destruction of power stations and telecommunication lines making re-supply and command of German units difficult.<sup>223</sup>

Overall, the Jedburghs maintained noteworthy success during the D-Day invasion and in the months that followed. Because of the absolute professionalism and expertise of the soldiers involved in the program, the French resistance was able to strike an appreciable blow against its four year oppressors. The Jeds and their counterparts fought with extreme valor and bravado following the principles of guerrilla warfare -- "'Surprise, mitraille, evanouissement', as the French called it; surprise, kill, vanish."<sup>224</sup> Out of the 82 American Jedburghs, 53 received the Distinguished Service Cross, Croix de Guerre, Legion of Merit, Silver or Bronze Star, or Purple Cross, thus claiming the highest percentage of citations during the entire war for a single unit.<sup>225</sup>

It is easy to establish the Jedburghs as an elite unit by simply comparing the unit's selection process, training, standards, esprit d' corps, and utility born out of crisis. No other unit could have accomplished this type of mission with the amount of

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<sup>219</sup> Warner, *Secret Forces*, 188.

<sup>220</sup> U.S. War Dept., *The War Report*, 204.

<sup>221</sup> U.S. War Dept., *The War Report*, 204.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

<sup>224</sup> Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, 234.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

success the Jeds enjoyed. Theirs is a perfect example of an elite force of World War II and is even comparable to the Special Forces of today.

This aspect of mission focused task selection, specific personnel recruitment, emphasis on legitimizing the insurgent forces, and further fostered and enhanced by the extensive interdepartmental training and experience driven intuition of the operators themselves, was the key factor for *tactical* success - punctuated by direct and tangible actions against German lines of communications - and a *strategic* success - the psychological effect on French population in seeing their oppressor weakened by their French kinsmen. But, it especially enhanced *operational* success – actions in anticipation of D-Day, on June 6<sup>th</sup>, and afterward in order to facilitate the introduction of Allied ground forces into mainland Europe and the subsequent liberation of France. Overall success, based on the conduct of the organization, remains high in terms of output and effect. In this case, the environmental situation, engaged by the organization, produced tactical and operational success, and had positive strategic implications that lasted to the end of the war. The overall outcome was positive and stands as such in the eyes of history.

*e. Conclusion: The Means Justify the Ends*

In the case of such a state sponsored terrorist threat, Unconventional Warfare stands as a viable offensive solution to at least part of the Global Terror problem. By judiciously employing the capabilities of indigenous or surrogate insurgent forces, with strict adherence to the concept effecting change in the state, or setting the conditions for follow-on action by legitimately influencing the population as a primary means, and attacking the established infrastructure as a supporting effort, the United States can wield an effective yet low cost weapon of global influence. In essence, the U.S. would foment certain insurgencies to defeat Global Insurgency propagated by a states that use terrorism against the U.S. and its interests.

Keeping in mind the three afore mentioned levels of support to an insurgency, this United States Unconventional Warfare strategy stands as a multi-operational approach to deterring and defeating international insurgency against civilized

and legitimate governments, and thusly against “Global Terrorism.”<sup>226</sup> Against a Nation-State exporting terrorists as a means of directly attacking the U.S., this concept can serve as a deterrent punishment for instigating insurgency abroad. Instead of FID in this circumstance, a more offensive Unconventional Warfare campaign or simply a conventional attack fits the analogy of fighting “Global Insurgents” by attacking a known base of operations, as the U.S. did in Afghanistan and Iraq. Such a determination of the source of the terrorist threat, and its unique attributes would steer either a punishment/offensive, or a preemptory/defensive deterrent campaign.

### **3. Direct Engagement (DE)**

Direct engagement is the last prong and a last resort in the Non-conventional interdiction strategy. Direct engagement can consist of surgical air strikes, direct action raids, or conventional force operations. DE can be unilateral or combined operations.

#### ***a. Conditions for Application***

There are three instances when DE should be used. First a time sensitive target of opportunity presents itself and it is in the best interest of the U.S. to take action i.e., the AC-130 strikes in Somalia. The second instance is, there is a need to punish a nation state, but the conditions for UW are nonexistent. Punishment can come in the form of raids and strikes on infrastructure or regime change. Lastly DE can be used as part of coercive diplomacy, but the effects desired need to be specific.

#### ***b. Creating a “Tipping Point”***

Unlike FID and UW operations DE is not contingent upon gaining the support of the population. The population should be considered in the conduct of any operation. The U.S. does not want to create a greater problem than it had prior to operations. Popular support is critical during reconstruction efforts, therefore decision makers must think about the ultimate end-state prior to conducting regime change. When DE is used as part of coercive diplomacy decision makers can use the “tipping point” concept to determine how much force needs to be applied to achieve the desired effect.

#### ***c. Considerations Prior to Authorizing Direct Engagement***

Prior to the authorization of DE decision makers must determine what the task and purpose is as well as the desired end-state of the DE. In addition the number of

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<sup>226</sup> When viewed and appreciated through the lens of Dr. McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond Model” and the various operational concepts to be employed against the State as an insurgent.



troops needed not only for the operation, but for SSTR operations if needed and the long-term effects on GWOT and U.S. foreign policy. In 1995 the U.S. committed to Operation Joint Endeavor, a **one year** [emphasis added] operation in Bosnia to separate the warring factions. U.S. forces were to be a part of the Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR transitioned to SFOR in December 1996. On 2 December 2004 the SFOR mission was terminated, nine years since the initial deployment.<sup>227</sup> The Bosnia mission was terminated sometime between 2003 and 2005.<sup>228</sup> The task, purpose, and ultimate end-state will help planners adequately forecast the necessary troop strength. As Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the number of troops needed to defeat the Iraqi Army and topple Saddam Hussein were far less than required to actually secure Iraq and set the conditions for SSTR operations.

**d. The Mystic Diamond and Successful Case of Application**

DE is primarily used to attack a nation state or group of people directly. It can be used to also achieve certain effects.

	Attack meaningless target	Attack infrastructure	Invade
Gain influence on existing government	1	2	
Punish existing government with intent to gain a concession	1	2	
Punish existing government		1	2
Regime Change			1

Figure 7. Examples of Desired Effects and suggested means of achievement

The U.S. has had successful conventional operations over the years. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is the most recent example of conducting regime change. The invasion primarily used OS 3, 4, and 5. Using OS 3 the U.S. attacked Iraq directly and topple the Iraqi government in short order. The U.S. attempted to use OS 4 to isolate Iraq internationally and was able to do so for the most part. The U.S. used OS 5 to extend to

<sup>227</sup> "Operation Joint Forge," *GlobalSecurity.org*, 27 April 2005 [Website]; available from [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/joint\\_forge.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/joint_forge.htm); accessed 16 April 2007.

<sup>228</sup> Congressional Budget Officer, "An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq: An Update," 5.

get international support for the invasion of Iraq. The U.S. had limited success gaining international support. Although the toppling of Saddam Hussein's government was successful, the SSTR efforts are abysmal. Iraq is an example of a desired end state that was unclear and military leaders were not prepared for.

An unsuccessful example of DE was the U.S. response to the 1998 embassy bombings. After the bombing of the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 the United States used OS 3 to attack al Qaeda's directly. The strikes attacked bin Laden's terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. The U.S. attacks in Afghanistan "had killed 20-30 in the camps but probably missed Bin Laden by a few hours."<sup>229</sup> The use of DE in this case was an abysmal failure and achieved no apparent effect.

### **C. REOURCES (MEANS)**

Yarger states that means "explain what specific resources are to be used in applying the concepts to accomplish the objectives and use no verb. Means can be tangible or intangible."<sup>230</sup> The NMSP-GWOT states "the combination of the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, the Combat Support Agencies, and the programs and resources of the Department of Defense constitute the military means for fighting the GWOT."<sup>231</sup> That is a general statement.

When determining the means, decision makers should conduct an analysis of who is best suited to execute the ways in order to achieve the ends. By examining each node of the proposed DoD structure and the intended purpose we can determine who is best suited.

#### **1. Foreign Internal Defense**

The FID force will conduct FID operations in friendly host nations. Any DoD unit should be able to conduct FID operations with additional training, but only SOF, Special Forces in particular, have FID as a core mission. JP 3-05 states

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<sup>229</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, 117.

<sup>230</sup> Yarger.

<sup>231</sup> United States Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, 8.

SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish nine core tasks: direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affair operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and information operations.<sup>232</sup>

Additionally JP 3-07.1 states “FID programs often require small US elements to deploy in isolated areas to support threatened HN governments.”<sup>233</sup> Special Forces soldiers are trained to operate in small teams in ambiguous environments. JP 3-07.1 further states

Training to prepare for military operations to support FID requires that a broad range of areas be covered. The training also must be designed to support a mix of personnel, ranging from language-trained and culturally focused SOF to those totally untrained in the specific area where the FID program is located.

SOF, primarily US Army special forces, PSYOP, and CA, receive extensive institutional training in language, cultural considerations, and instructional techniques as qualifications in their basic specialty. These personnel should be extensively used to train HN forces and facilitate liaison with the HN.<sup>234</sup>

DoD has a force already trained and able to execute FID operations. Conventional forces or interagency personnel could augment as needed. For larger combined conventional exercises SOF could act as liaison elements between the host nation and conventional forces. By using SOF primarily DoD is still able to concentrate conventional forces on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

## **2. Unconventional Warfare**

Unconventional Warfare like FID requires small teams to operate in remote hazardous conditions. UW is a core mission for SOF, specifically SF, and should be the primary personnel to conduct UW. If the President of the United States determines that UW operations should be covert then within DoD SOF forces are best suited, but would fall under the restriction of Title 50, Chapter 15, subchapter III, section 413b.

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<sup>232</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, (Washington DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 December 2003), viii.

<sup>233</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, IV-3.

<sup>234</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, IV-3.

Each finding shall specify each department, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such action. Any employee, contractor, or contract agent of a department, agency, or entity of the United States Government other than the Central Intelligence Agency directed to participate in any way in a covert action shall be subject either to the policies and regulations of the Central Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or regulations adopted by such department, agency, or entity, to govern such participation.<sup>235</sup>

Conventional forces and interagency personnel as required by the mission can also augment SOF.

### **3. Direct Engagement**

Any component of DoD is capable of conducting DE operations. A troops to task analysis should be conducted by decision makers to determine the best DoD asset to use to conduct each specific DE operation.

### **4. Intelligence**

As mentioned in the overall strategy the SFGCIN personnel would perform the intelligence node. For further details see *Optimizing Army Special Forces Leaders in a Global Counter-Insurgency Network* by Joshua H. Walker and Eric J. Deal. Interagency personnel as needed could augment the SFGCIN. Midlevel SF officers are the nucleus of the SFGCIN.

### **5. Regional Headquarters Hub**

The regional headquarters is responsible for the command and control of the FID, UW, DE, and intelligence nodes. As such it should be capable of providing support to those elements, which for UW and certain DE missions would require additional SOF assets. There fore a Joint Special Operations Task Force should serve as the regional headquarters hub.

### **6. Higher Headquarters Hub**

As stated in Chapter II SOCOM was given the lead for combating the GWOT, therefore SOCOM should fill the role of the higher headquarters hub linking all regional headquarters together.

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<sup>235</sup> "Presidential approval and reporting of covert actions," *Title 50-U.S. Code, Sec. 413b*, 3 January 2005 [Website]; available from <http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/50C15.txt>; Internet, accessed 18 April 2007.

## **7. Recommended Force of Choice**

Special Forces soldiers are ideally suited to carry out two out of the three actions arms of the Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy. FID and UW are core tasks of SF and are trained upon. In addition midlevel SF officers are ideally suited to man the SFGCIN.

The United States Special Forces (USSF or SF), from its official inception in 1952, continues to influence world politics as an underlying force of deterrence. Only recently have current events brought this elite organization to the forefront of American strategic thought. As such, organizational models of structure and employment, with tactical and operational successes, have been realized during the GWOT, with campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines.

Far from being the Nation's catch all deterrent solution, this capability, in effect, carries ample credibility and stability to stand as an effective deterrent tactic for the United States.<sup>236</sup> The use of SF is credible. Competing nations recognize the inherent threat that such a deployment of capabilities entails, and the message that the United States is relaying. Nations understand this strategic communication. At the same time, utilization of SF is stable. The United States, although sending a strong message with the deployment of the Special Forces in other than war scenarios, rarely provokes escalated response with such a maneuver, hence stability.

The global effect of the United States Special Forces on global terrorism, the insurgents' state sponsors, or any other nation the U.S. wishes to influence, stems not from the Special Forces' ability to conduct kinetic operations, but from their presence and capabilities as soldiers, statesmen and sensors. SF also stands as the United States' primary military instrument shaping U.S. ground truth relations around the globe. As the recognized preeminent guerrilla force, and subsequent COIN force, Special Forces continues to not only train fledgling or reconstituted armies, help form internal stability mechanisms, and develop international relations between the U.S. and other countries, but also mold the mindset or strategies of those nations through close interaction.

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<sup>236</sup> P.K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 4.

Regardless of the mode of operation, SF's methods separate and exemplify its capability as a deterrent mechanism for the United States of America. As national sensors, the Green Berets operate in the open and/or behind the lines. Information and actionable intelligence is not only generated from the trench-coated spy, or the confessions of a captured enemy, but also from the daily interactions of SF soldiers while visiting the local market, or serving at an embassy. Either way, this soldier's situational awareness weighs heavily on the minds it opposes. The insurgent or government force is already taxed and concerned with daily operations and a life dominated by conflict, extending from the lowest operator to the highest national decision maker. While not only worried about the obvious kinetic operations that Special Forces conducts, resulting in direct physical destruction of the adversary, the insurgent or nation influenced must also redouble its efforts in securing and safeguarding its supporting infrastructure: that which SF targets non-kinetically, such as popular support, organizational structure, operational information and material support channels. The United States thus maintains such a decisive point of influence with Special Forces. Trained in kinetic action, this adaptive individual is also highly skilled in the non-kinetic applications of influence from the battlefield, to the elders' tent, to the conference table. And, far from being just America's "Global Scouts", this entity has the functionality to operate, when needed, on its own, or in austere command conditions.

## V. IS THE STRATEGY BALANCED?<sup>237</sup>

By using Art Lykke's stool model a strategists is afforded an opportunity to examine the strategy to see if it is balanced. In Richard Yarger's piece *Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model* Yarger proposes three questions to test strategy.<sup>238</sup> The three questions are:

- Is it suitable?
- Is it feasible?
- Is it acceptable?<sup>239</sup>

These three questions will help determine any shortcomings of the strategy.<sup>240</sup> The answers will dictate whether to lengthen or shorten a leg (ends, ways, and means) of the stool to achieve the required balance. If one leg is too long the strategy is accepting some risk in one area.

### A. SUITABILITY

The Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy will produce the desired effects as it relates to the objectives. The proposed strategy directly supports the following objectives out of the National Strategy and the Department of Defense related to the GWOT:

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<sup>237</sup> The structure for the "Is the Strategy Balanced?" grew out a paper by Glenn Johnson, Carl Morris, and David Sears, "Global War on Terrorism Ground Special Operation Forces Foreign Internal Defense Strategy," (Unpublished paper, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006).

<sup>238</sup> Yarger. The stool concept is a very simplified way to look at strategy. Yarger states "in the Lykke model the ends are objectives, the ways are the concepts for accomplishing the objectives, and the means are the resources for supporting the concepts." Each leg of the stool represents the objectives (ends), concepts (ways), or resources (means). Each leg must be of equal length (importance) to maintain the balance and minimize risk.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid.

<sup>240</sup> Douglas Borer, *Warfare in the Information Age*, (Class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, 03 April 2006).

	FID	UW	DE
Champion aspirations for human dignity	1	2	
Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends	1	2	
Work with others to defuse regional conflicts	1	2	3
Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)	1	3	2
Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy	1	2	
Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power <sup>241</sup>	1		
Prevent attacks by terrorist networks	1	2	3
Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them	1	3	2
Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states		1	2
Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror		1	2
Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism <sup>242</sup>	1	2	
Secure the United States from direct attack	1	2	3
Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action	1	3	2
Strengthen alliances and partnerships	1	2	
Establish favorable security conditions <sup>243</sup>	1	2	
Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive	1	2	3
Enable partner nations to counter terrorism	1	2	
Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials and increase capacity for consequence management	3	2	1
Defeat terrorists and their organizations	2	3	1
Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations	1	2	3
Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism <sup>244</sup>	1	2	

Figure 8. Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy support to existing strategic objectives (the number defines the preferred way to support each of the objectives)

<sup>241</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, 1.

<sup>242</sup> The White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, 1.

<sup>243</sup> United States Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2005, iv.

<sup>244</sup> United States Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, 6-7.



The strategy will not provide quick results, but will offer a realistic approach to continue efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and still wage the GWOT. Using an indirect approach to promote cooperation amongst fellow nations will also indirectly promote democracy and U.S. values around the globe.

## **B. FEASIBILITY**

Is DoD capable of carrying out this strategy? DoD has the means to carry out the strategy as proposed in the long-term. The 2006 QDR calls for an increase in SOF and conventional forces. Until the called for growth is achieved DoD would have to accept some risk either in not fully implementing the strategy or in force levels supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the current operational tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan as high as it is DoD would pay a price to fully implement this strategy. Operational readiness rates would decrease in addition to possible troop burnout.

To mitigate the risk DoD has two feasible options, phased implementation or a reduction of SOF support to Iraq and Afghanistan and use SOF as a force multiplier. In the phased implementation DoD would implement the strategy in priority countries only and as troop levels decreased in Iraq and Afghanistan other countries would be added. In the second option SOF force levels would be refocused to concentrate on the GWOT and allow the conventional military to concentrate on Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. SOF forces are needed to support both operations, but a thorough troop to task analysis should be conducted to ensure current SOF levels are sufficient.

In order to effectively implement the SFGCIN proposed by Josh Walker and Eric Deal as part of the Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy the personnel management of mid-level Special Forces officers would have to occur.

## **C. ACCEPTABILITY**

Are the cost justified to achieve the objectives? Is the strategy acceptable to U.S. values? In the Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy the cost do justify the means. Implementation of the strategy allows DoD to tackle the GWOT without massive reorganization or increased costs. The strategy is sustainable for DoD. The political cost of implementing the strategy is also acceptable. By backing off of rhetoric and the use of a large number of troops the strategy is likely to fly under the radar of Congressional and

World leaders. The strategy does not alter U.S. values and indirectly promotes them on a global scale. Lastly this strategy actually focuses on the GWOT and brings it back to forefront of DoD and National Security concerns. The strategy is acceptable.

#### **D. IMPLEMENTATION**

In order to implement this recommended strategy the President, politicians, and the U.S. public must be convinced that it will work and the strategy must be monitored.

The Secretary of Defense should present the strategy to the President of the United States. Once the President has bought into the strategy, his staff can present it to Congress and the U.S. public stressing the need to bring the GWOT to the forefront of U.S. military affairs. An admission that the current approach is not working and there is a need to try something different should go a long way to achieving Congressional and public buy in.

Part of achieving the necessary political and public buy-in is convincing each that there is a system in place to monitor and a process to reassess the strategy. The process should be similar to the QDR, but occur yearly. The personnel that conduct the reassessment should include personnel within DoD, but also at the National Security level. Including outside personnel will allow for a fresh perspective and ensure that the strategy meets with the President's priorities.

#### **E. HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATION**

Let us assume that while the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan continue the Iranian situation begins to heat up, simultaneously negotiations with North Korea sour, and the U.S. public is demanding the U.S. put more emphasis on the GWOT. Assuming that current force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan must be sustained what military options are available to the President of the United States?

Even ruling out conventional attacks on Iran and North Korea with the Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy the President has several options. FID is ruled out since both of those countries are hostile.

- Conduct UW in Iran and North Korea.
- Conduct DE strikes in Iran and North Korea.

- Conduct UW in Iran and DE in North Korea.
- Conduct DE in Iran and UW in North Korea.

Since it is alleged that North Korea has nuclear weapons the U.S. should rule out any DE strikes and even a UW campaign. A DE strike or a UW campaign on North Korea would be acceptable as it would meet U.S. objectives, is militarily feasible, but the risk of a nuclear confrontation or escalation of tensions between North and South Korea is unacceptable. Instead the U.S. should continue to engage North Korea using information and diplomatic elements of national power. Simultaneously with those options DoD can continue to conduct FID in priority countries that are supporting and assisting in the combat of the GWOT.

The President would need to decide whether to use DE strikes or a UW campaign against Iran. Louis Rene Beres argues that “Precise defensive attacks against Iran's nuclear assets would be effective – and they would be entirely legal.”<sup>245</sup> Beres claims

It would be lawful because the US and/or Israel would be acting in appropriate self-defense. Both countries could act on behalf of the international community and could do so lawfully without wider approval. The right of self-defense by forestalling an attack has a long and authoritative history in international law.<sup>246</sup>

Beres also asserts that the U.S. has a plan called the “McInerney Plan” that calls “for an immediate strike force to hit Iran’s nuclear development facilities, command and control centers, integrated air defenses, selected Air Force and Navy units, and its Shahab-3 missiles.”<sup>247</sup> The plan could be carried out by the U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles.

What consequences might be the result of DE strikes on Iran’s nuclear program? Would it truly deter Iran from trying to join the nuclear capable nations? In the same article Beres discusses one consequence, “such strikes would probably entail high civilian casualties because Iran has deliberately placed sensitive military assets amid civilian

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<sup>245</sup> Louis Rene Beres, “The Case for Strikes against Iran: Diplomacy alone won't stop Iran's nuclear ambitions,” *csmonitor.com*, 8 May 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0508/p09s01-coop.html?page=1>; Internet, accessed 19 May 2007.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid.*

populations – an international crime called "perfidy."<sup>248</sup> Most likely Iran would continue to pursue such a program, but the strike would force the program underground (making it harder to strike) and/or Iran would continue co-locate facilities next to key civilian sites. World reaction could range from acceptance to outrage. A DE strike on Iran would be acceptable as it would meet U.S. objectives, is militarily feasible, but the risk of excessive collateral damage and the potential loss of world political capital is unacceptable.

Ruling out DE strikes on Iran, the President is left with the UW option. Iran does have existing opposition/separatist groups that U.S. forces could work by, with, and through. Here are some of the Iranian opposition and separatists groups:

- National Council of Resistance of Iran.<sup>249</sup>
- People's Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI)<sup>250</sup> a.k.a. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK).<sup>251</sup>
- Al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front.<sup>252</sup>
- Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz.<sup>253</sup>
- Jundallah a.k.a. People's Resistance Movement of Iran (PRMI)-Baloch Nationalists.<sup>254</sup>
- Balochistan People's Party (BPP).<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> Louis Rene Beres, "The Case for Strikes against Iran: Diplomacy alone won't stop Iran's nuclear ambitions," *csmonitor.com*, 8 May 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0508/p09s01-coop.html?page=1>; Internet, accessed 19 May 2007.

<sup>249</sup> "Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran," *National Council of Resistance of Iran*, 18 May 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.ncr-iran.org/>; Internet; accessed 18 May 2007.

<sup>250</sup> Chris Zambelis, "Baloch Nationalists Up the Ante in Iran," *Terrorism Focus Volume IV Issue 3*, 27 February 2007 [Website]; available from [http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/tf\\_004\\_003.pdf](http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/tf_004_003.pdf); Internet; accessed 18 May 2007, 3.

<sup>251</sup> United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006*, 30 April 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/>; Internet; accessed 18 May 2007, Chapter 6.

<sup>252</sup> "Al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front," *MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base*, 15 April 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4607>; Internet; accessed 18 May 2007.

<sup>253</sup> "Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz," *MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base*, 15 April 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=27261>; Internet; accessed 18 May 2007.

<sup>254</sup> Zambelis, 3-4.

<sup>255</sup> "An Introduction to Balochistan and Balochistan People's Party," *Balochistan People's Party (BPP)*, 2004 [Website]; available from <http://www.ostomaan.org/>; Internet; accessed 19 May 2007.

The most likely group that the U.S. can approach is the NCRI-PMOI-MEK.<sup>256</sup> In a February 2006 *Christian Science Monitor* article “Raymond Tanter, a former National Security Council Middle East specialist during the George H.W. Bush administration” states “Other opposition groups really don’t exist,” and “If we are serious about working with groups from within, it will have to be with the MEK, because there’s no other opposition force the regime cares about.”<sup>257</sup> The MEK appears to be a viable opposition group.

Estimates place MEK's worldwide membership in the several thousands, with large pockets in Paris and other major European capitals. In Iraq, roughly 3,400 MEK members are gathered under Coalition supervision at Camp Ashraf, the MEK's main compound north of Baghdad, where they have been designated as "protected persons" under Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention...As a condition of the 2003 cease-fire agreement, the MEK relinquished more than 2,000 tanks; armored personnel carriers; and heavy artillery.<sup>258</sup>

The NCRI-PMOI-MEK is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State under the title Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK).<sup>259</sup> A decision to remove the NCRI-PMOI-MEK from the U.S. terrorist list might receive Congressional support and approval. The same *Christian Science* article states “several members of Congress are pressing to remove the MEK from the terror-group list.”<sup>260</sup> Additionally member countries of the European Union might also support such a decision. The NCRI makes the following claims regarding International support:

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<sup>256</sup> The State Department lists the NCRI and PMOI as an alias of the MEK see United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006*, 30 April 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 May 2007, Chapter 6. Additionally the NCRI lists the MEK as being one of its member organizations see *National Council of Resistance of Iran*, (n.d.) [Website]; available from <http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/ncri.html>; Internet, accessed 19 May 2007. NCRI appears to be a political umbrella organization for several groups. For the remainder of the paper it will be referred to as the NCRI-PMOI-MEK.

<sup>257</sup> Howard LaFranchi, “A Bid to Foment Democracy in Iran,” *csmonitor.com*, 17 February 2006 [Website]; available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0217/p03s03-usfp.html>; Internet, accessed 19 May 2007.

<sup>258</sup> United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006*.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> LaFranchi.

- In 2004 120 members of European Parliament and some European countries governments support the NCRI and request the removal of the PMOI from the terrorist lists.<sup>261</sup>
- In 2002 “150 members of the US House of Representatives expressed their support for the democratic objectives of the National Council of Resistance of Iran and of its President-elect, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi.”<sup>262</sup>
- In 2001 “32 American senators: "US policy should reach out to those working to establish a democratic and pluralistic system in the country. In this context, support for the democratic goals of the National Council of Resistance of Iran and its President-elect, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, whose objectives are supported by the majority of Iranians, can contribute to peace, human rights and regional stability." <sup>263</sup>
- In 2000 “228 members of the US House of Representatives: "It is only our support for the Iranian people's aspirations for fundamental change and the democratic goals of the National Council of Resistance, that can contribute to the promotion of peace, human rights and stability in this part of the world." <sup>264</sup>

How would the rest of the Middle East react to a decision to recognize the NCRI-PMOI-MEK and support an insurgency within Iran? We can speculate that the Sunni Middle East would most likely support a U.S. decision to support an insurgency in Shia Iran. If the U.S. were to expand the groups it approached to include the Al-Ahwaz Arab People’s Democratic Front and the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz the traditional Arab states in the Gulf region would be more likely support the decision.

There are two other major groups that must be considered, Israel and al Qaeda. Israel would likely support the action, because as was demonstrated when Israel struck Saddam’s nuclear program Israel will not tolerate a nuclear Muslim state so close to its borders. Al Qaeda would attempt to use the support to an insurgency as a propaganda tool. Al Qaeda would see the U.S. as attacking Islam again and try to rally Muslims against the U.S.

Looking at the Iran scenario we can see that using U.S. sponsored UW is a suitable solution to achieve U.S. objectives. Iran is currently pursuing the ability to

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<sup>261</sup> *National Council of Resistance of Iran*, About NCRI.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid..

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

generate nuclear energy which could lead to nuclear weapons. Additionally it is alleged that Iran is interfering with U.S. efforts in Iraq. The UW course of action supports the following U.S. objectives:

- Champion aspirations for human dignity.
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).<sup>265</sup>
- Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use.
- Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states.
- Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.<sup>266</sup>
- Establish favorable security conditions.<sup>267</sup>
- Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive.
- Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials and increase capacity for consequence management.
- Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations.
- Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.<sup>268</sup>

It should not be expected that these objectives will be achieved right away, but over the long-term they are achievable.

With the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and assuming the Iranian opposition/separatists groups are willing to work with the U.S. UW is the only feasible option available to DoD to topple the Iranian regime. DoD would have to redirect some SOF forces, specifically Special Forces A-teams, but would be able to maintain the bulk of DoD forces supporting Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally U.S. close air support

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<sup>265</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington DC: Executive Office of the President, March 2006), 1.

<sup>266</sup> The White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, 1.

<sup>267</sup> United States Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2005), iv.

<sup>268</sup> United States Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, 6-7.

assets might be needed to support the UW campaign. The commitment level of the U.S. to supporting an insurgency would determine if SF and close air support assets would be committed to actively participating.

If the President and Congress determine that Iran is a legitimate threat to U.S. forces in Iraq and U.S. interests employing the UW component of the Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy is an acceptable option for dealing with a state sponsor of terrorism that is pursuing nuclear energy, and is allegedly interfering in U.S. efforts in Iraq. UW can be conducted covertly to try and minimize world outrage. There might be a high political cost (since Congress is war weary) for taking action against Iran, but UW presents the lowest cost for toppling the Iranian regime.

If Iran were to find out that the U.S. was supporting an insurgency within Iran what kind of reaction could the U.S. expect from Iran? Iran has several options:

- Iran could express outrage in the media in which the U.S. could conduct negotiations with Iran promising to withdraw all support to the Iranian insurgency if Iran stops pursuing nuclear energy and interfering in Iraq.
- Iran could mobilize its Army and invade Iraq attacking U.S. forces. This would be the worst case scenario for U.S. forces in Iraq and would bear a high political cost for the President.
- Iran could encourage Hezbollah attacks on U.S. personnel, assets, and interests. This would be the absolute worst case scenario for the U.S. as a country.

If the U.S. were to attack Iran conventionally Iran's most likely response would be option 2 while expressing outrage in the world forum. Iran's response could be virtually the same, but by using UW instead of a conventional attack the U.S. would be minimizing direct risk by exposing fewer troops. As the reader can see the options presented by the Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy are viable military options. The UW option for the Iran scenario is suitable, feasible, and acceptable.



## **VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. CONCLUSION**

International terrorists survive and operate much, as would an internal national revolution. In leading this fight against global terrorism, it would seem obvious to forward this proposed strategy with the mechanisms already aligned to defeating it. This concept has escaped the notice of policy makers in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and continues to remain under-utilized around the world as the U.S. continues to rely on kinetic/conventional, versus non-kinetic, civil-military methods of operation. Limited operational success primarily stems from the Special Forces (SF) and their understanding of interagency coordination, insurgency, and an application of the IDAD, but is contained at only the lowest tactical levels and typically not coordinated or supported by conventional forces. To the rest of the military, SF remains the force of choice to “kick over rocks and see what turns up.”<sup>269</sup>

This thesis has argued that the U.S. and DoD’s GWOT strategies are overly direct in nature and can not be sustained for a “long war” nor are suited for the type of threat that the U.S. faces. The Non-conventional interdiction Strategy offers a viable solution for DoD to implement in the conduct of the GWOT. The strategy still allows DoD to focus on the ability to fight a conventional enemy in a conventional manner. The primary use of indirect methods coupled with prioritized surgical strikes provides a realistic approach for the DoD.

In order to have a truly balanced GWOT strategy a National GWOT strategy that encompasses all elements of national power must be developed. It is important to note that this strategy is not a quick results strategy. It is a long-term strategy that uses SOF forces to lower the financial and manpower costs. Although this strategy is less manpower intensive than a standard conventional approach, resources are finite and as such areas to implement it need to be prioritized.

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<sup>269</sup> Comments made to the author by a senior J-3 SOD official at the Pentagon during a capabilities brief and in response to a question referencing Special Forces’ overall COIN Campaign Strategy.

By adopting our proposal, the United States can put the leading role in the Global War on Terrorism in the hands of the people who understand it the best. By leading the effort using a counterinsurgency strategy, U.S. Special Forces teams can help the U.S. achieve victory at the smallest cost and in the minimum amount of time.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

In essence, our basic recommendation to the hypothesis put forth by this paper is the new strategic focus of Non-Conventional warfare, described earlier in Chapter IV. Through out the course of doing the research for this thesis several other problems and questions were encountered. These problems should be further researched, but we felt it necessary to briefly address some of these issues as a further take away for the reader. As stated earlier to effectively fight the GWOT it will take all elements of national power to execute.

**Problem:** Lack of a central agency or organization charged with the implementation and conduct of the GWOT.

**Discussion:** One of the major problems with the conduct of the GWOT is leadership. Leadership as defined as “the ability to guide, direct, or influence people”.<sup>270</sup> Who is in charge for the conduct of the GWOT?

Michael Vickers’ Congressional testimony states that the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is “charged with national strategic and operational planning [but]... lacks the authority and capabilities to fulfill its mandate.”<sup>271</sup> In addition to the NCTC, the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), USSOCOM, Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs), the CIA Counter Terrorism Center, the Department of State, and the Department of Homeland Security all have some responsibility for the GWOT either at the strategic or operational level.<sup>272</sup> Many organizations involved in the GWOT, each with no authority over the other, create an environment for bureaucratic confusion.

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<sup>270</sup> “Leadership,” *Encarta World English Dictionary*, (n.d.) [Website]; available from [http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary\\_/leadership.html](http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/leadership.html); Internet; accessed 24 February 2007.

<sup>271</sup> Vickers, 2.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

Within DoD, SOCOM was given “the lead in planning the war on terror” by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.<sup>273</sup> The President shifted SOCOM’s role from a supporting command to a supported command with the 2005 Unified Command Plan. The “2005 Unified Command Plan gives USSOCOM... responsibility to plan, synchronize for DOD, and, when directed, execute Special Operations in the war on terror.”<sup>274</sup> Being a supported command is problematic. SOCOM does not have any specific geographic responsibility. The GCCs are responsible for specific geographic regions. With the GCCs and Commander of SOCOM all being the same rank, this creates the same situation as seen at the national level. The GCCs report directly to the Secretary of Defense as does the Commander of SOCOM.

The conduct of the GWOT will continue to be disjointed and fragmented until one organization is in charge that has the power and authority to unite all supporting governmental agencies.

**Recommendation 1:** Use existing law and empower the Committee on Transnational Threats. The National Security Act of 1947 establishes “within the National Security Council a committee to be known as Committee on Transnational Threats.”<sup>275</sup> The act specifies the following members: Director of Central Intelligence, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (also directed to serve as the chairperson), and such other members as the President may designate.<sup>276</sup> “The function of the Committee shall be to coordinate and direct the activities of the United States Government relating to combating transnational threats.”<sup>277</sup> Transnational threats could be expanded to include

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<sup>273</sup> Bryan D. Brown, “U.S. Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 40, 2006 [journal online]; available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/issue40.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/issue40.htm); Internet; accessed 23 February 2007, 39.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.

<sup>275</sup> “National Security Act of 1947: Act of July 26, 1947 (As Amended),” *United States Intelligence Committee*, 13 October 2004 [Website]; available from [http://www.intelligence.gov/0-natsecact\\_1947.shtml#s101](http://www.intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml#s101); Internet; accessed 1 May 2007, Section 101, paragraph i-1.

<sup>276</sup> Ibid., Section 101, paragraph i-2.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid., Section 101, paragraph i-3

the GWOT. The chairperson title might be moved to someone else, a person whose sole focus is fighting the GWOT; a person similar to the position of “War Czar” that President Bush is trying to establish.<sup>278</sup>

Lastly, the President would need to expand the already existing tasks and authorities as defined in Section 101, paragraph i-4 to include tasking authority to control, direct, and synchronize all elements of national power in relation to the GWOT. It is essential that this organization has the authority to task the various agencies to execute the GWOT.

**Recommendation 2:** Give operational control of SOCOM to the Committee on Transnational Threats. Give SOCOM tasking authority to task other DoD organizations, specifically the GCCs, in the conduct of the GWOT.

And it is with this final capstone thought that we close this discussion of an alternative to the current DoD strategic engagement to the GWOT. By identifying the threat with clearly understood concepts, already ingrained in the non-conventional units within the military, a more obvious solution comes to the surface. Irregular threats and strategies should be preempted and countered with irregular capabilities, those that the United States Special Operations Forces have honed since their inception.

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<sup>278</sup> Peter Baker and Thomas E. Hicks, “In White House Plan, War ‘Czar’ Would Cut Through Bureaucracy,” *washingtonpost.com*, 12 April 2007 [Website]; available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/12/AR2007041202147.html>; Internet; accessed 1 May 2007.

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